The Transformation of Human Rights Litigation: the Alien Tort Statute, the Anti-Terrorism Act, and JASTA by Schnably, Stephen J.
University of Miami Law School
University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository
University of Miami International and Comparative Law Review
8-25-2017
The Transformation of Human Rights Litigation:
the Alien Tort Statute, the Anti-Terrorism Act, and
JASTA
Stephen J. Schnably
University of Miami School of Law, schnably@law.miami.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umiclr
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the National
Security Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in University of Miami International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional
Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stephen J. Schnably, The Transformation of Human Rights Litigation: the Alien Tort Statute, the Anti-Terrorism Act, and JASTA, 24 U.
Miami Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 285 ()
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umiclr/vol24/iss2/5
THE TRANSFORMATION OFHUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION: THE
ALIEN TORT STATUTE, THEANTI-TERRORISMACT, AND JASTA
Stephen J. Schnably1
A quarter century ago, the prospects for federal civil litigation
of international human rights violations under the Alien Tort
Statute (ATS) seemed bright. With the statute’s modern
revival, a decade earlier in Filártiga, foreign nationals, often
with no recourse in their own countries, had a forum for
judicial vindication of a broad range of wrongs by state
officials, multinational corporations, and even, in limited
circumstances, foreign states themselves. The Supreme
Court’s Kiobel decision in 2013, however, may signal the end
of the Filártiga revolution, with Congress’s seeming
acquiescence: Congress, after all, could amend the ATS if it
disagreed with the Court. Congress’s inaction should not be
attributed to inertia, for Congress has not been idle. Over the
same period, it has continually expanded civil liability for
foreign terrorist acts against American nationals, even to the
point of effectively intervening in ongoing cases. The recent
Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA) is the
latest example. The near demise of the ATS and the growth of
anti-terrorism legislation are of a piece. They represent a turn
1 Professor of Law, University of Miami. I would like to thank Lili Levi
and Sergio Campos for thoughtful comments, and Sean Fard and Juan
Olano for excellent research assistance. I would also like to acknowledge
the Review’s founding editor-in-chief, Víctor Marroquín, J.D. 1992
(Miami), LL.M. 1993 (Harvard), whose vision and dedication as a
student benefited the Law School and presaged a distinguished career as
a lawyer and public figure in Peru.
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away from a cosmopolitan vision of building a global legal
order, in which all states protect human rights regardless of
nationality. The emphasis in the more nationalist vision today
on protecting Americans from terrorism has some merit, but
in practice it lends itself to the use of civil litigation as a
weapon against foreign states, often at the expense of the
victims the legislation purports to serve. Moreover, the sharp
division between Americans and foreigners, with protection
only of the former, risks casting foreigners as dangerous
others. The division is also unrealistic, given the pervasive
effect U.S. actions have throughout the world. Recognition of
this effect would also help counter the understanding of many
ATS cases, including Filártiga itself, as foreign many times
over—“foreign cubed” in the jargon applied to ATS cases
involving a foreign plaintiff and foreign defendant litigating
over actions that took place in a foreign country. Rather than
simply representing the intrusion of foreign concerns into
federal courts, ATS cases may serve U.S. democratic interests
by helping to cast light on the harmful effects on human rights
that U.S. policy may have.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The first issue of the University of Miami Yearbook of
International Law, as it was known in 1991, commenced
with Sir Robert Jennings’ fascinating assessment of the
sweeping changes in international law he had observed (and
help shape) over a distinguished career spanning more than
half a century.2 Among other things, he took note of the rise
of international human rights law—“a radical change from
the traditional law which protected individuals only in the
capacity of aliens, and only then in terms of the injury done
not to the individual but to the State of his nationality.”3
U.S. ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights in 1992 seemed to confirm that this radical
change had taken root here. 4 Perhaps even more telling,
federal civil litigation to remedy violations of internationally
protected human rights—most notably (though not
exclusively) under the aegis of the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS)5— appeared to herald a cosmopolitan vision in which
2 Sir Robert Y. Jennings, An International Lawyer Takes Stock, 1 U. MIAMI
YEARBOOK INT’L L. 1 (1991).
3 Id. at 9–14, 10.
4 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 95-20 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
5 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). The statute provides, in full, “The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort
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federal courts not only protected human rights on a global
basis but helped build a global legal order that recognizes
the rights and worth of every human being, regardless of
nationality.
In 1991, Harold Koh captured the potential sweep of these
developments with his analysis of “transnational public law
litigation,”6 of which ATS litigation was one example. Only a
decade earlier, in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, the Second Circuit
had blessed the modern revival of the statute.7 The court
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.” It was enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and
has remained essentially unchanged since then, though subject to some
minor modifications. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and
Article III, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 587, 587 & nn.1-2 (2002).
6 Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J.
2347, 2347 (1991) (describing such litigation as encompassing
“international human rights suits brought by aliens against foreign and
United States governments and officials under the Alien Tort Statute, as
well as actions by foreign governments against individual, American
government, and corporate defendants.”). For a more limited approach,
against which Koh argued, see Lea Brilmayer, International Law in
American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100 YALE L.J. 2277 (1991).
7 Fílartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F. 2d 876, 878 (2d. Cir. 1980); see generally
WILLIAM J. ACEVES, THEANATOMY OF TORTURE: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF FILÁRTIGA V. PENA IRALA (2007); See also RICHARDALAN
WHITE, BREAKING SILENCE: THECASE THATCHANGED THE FACE OF
HUMAN RIGHTS (2004). Moreover, the ALI’s Third Restatement of
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held that torture was a violation of the law of nations. What
struck many commentators about the case was that it
involved events with seemingly no relation to U.S. actors or
territory: A Paraguayan police official had tortured and
murdered the son of a Paraguayan political dissident in
Paraguay.8
With this recognition of a role for human rights in federal
courts, litigation could proceed against individuals and
states who violated basic human rights abroad. Practical
questions relating to service of process might put some limit
on bringing some foreign human rights violators to court.
Still, the draw of the United States’ global status—and,
sadly, its close working relationships with many officials in
governments with poor human rights records—could
Foreign Relations Law, adopted in 1987, included a broad definition of
what constitutes human rights violations, bolstering plaintiffs who
sought relief based on the ATS. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAWOF THEUNITED STATES § 702 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
8 Filártiga, 630 F. 2d at 878-79. To be sure, the plaintiffs and defendant
were in fact living in Brooklyn at the time of the lawsuit. This connection
allowed for personal jurisdiction: The defendant Norberto Peña-Irala
was served while in detention in Brooklyn for overstaying his visa. Id. at
878 (plaintiff was living in the U.S., having applied for political asylum).
But the connection was not critical to subject matter jurisdiction.
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provide opportunities to effect proper service on former
human rights violators here in the U.S.9
At the start of the nineties there also appeared to be a
genuine political commitment to making some form of
universal jurisdiction real. One example was the United
States’ signing of the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in
1988, with ratification following six years later. 10 The
9 For example, after former President Marcos was forced out of power in
1989, he moved to Hawaii, where he was subject to service. See Estate of
Domingo v. Republic of Philippines, 808 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1987); see
generallyWILLIAM J. ACEVES, UNITED STATES OFAMERICA: A SAFEHAVEN
FOR TORTURERS (Amnesty International USA 2002); see Xuncax v.
Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 169 (D. Mass 1995) (service of an ATS
complaint on Hector Gramajo, a former Defense Minister of Guatemala,
while attending Harvard).
10 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465
U.N.T.S. 85 [hearinafter Convention Against Torture]; seeMessage to the
Senate Transmitting the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, May 20, 1988, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988) (“The core provisions of the Convention
establish a regime for international cooperation in the criminal
prosecution of torturers relying on so-called ‘universal jurisdiction.’”).
The U.S. became a party to the treaty on October 21, 1994. See
Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General: Status, Dec.
31, 2009, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/26, 360. .
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Convention requires states to prosecute alleged torturers
within their jurisdiction, without regard to the citizenship of
the perpetrator and victims or where the torture occurred, if
the state does not extradite the alleged torturer to another
appropriate state for prosecution.11
As the International and Comparative Law Review marks its
twenty-fifth anniversary, the landscape looks very different.
Since 1991, major Supreme Court and lower court decisions
have significantly limited the scope of the ATS. In Sosa v.
Alvarez Machain, 12 the Supreme Court rejected most
sweeping attacks on the ATS, but signaled a determination
to limit ATS litigation to a relatively narrow class of claims.13
In 2013, the Court struck a second and much more serious
blow against the statute. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.
held that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies
to the statute.14 Some ATS claims will survive, but as one
11 Convention Against Torture, supra note 10 at art. 5(2).
12 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
13 Id. at 698, 748.
14 Koibel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
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commentator put it, Kiobel “signals the end of the Filártiga
human rights revolution.”15
These holdings and others evidence a general hardening of
judicial attitudes against the application of international
human rights norms in federal courts. This change in the
judicial landscape, moreover, reflects a deep consensus in
the political branches, across parties and enduring over time,
that international human rights law is generally to be treated
more as a policy matter than a legal commitment.
To conclude that what seemed to be an expanding universe
in 1991 is now in a state of contraction and even collapse
would, however, greatly oversimplify what has happened in
the intervening quarter century. For there has been one
persistent growth area since 1991: litigation against states
and other non-state actors for committing or supporting
terrorism. It is a development Congress has not only
endorsed, but actively promoted. And it strongly suggests
that Congress’s inaction in the face of the Court’s restrictive
interpretation of the ATS is not a matter of inattention or
inertia. On the contrary, taken together, the near-demise of
the ATS and the explosive growth in anti-terrorism
15 Roger P. Alford, The Future of Human Rights Litigation After Kiobel, 89
NOTREDAME L. REV. 1749, 1753 (2014); see also Ernest A. Young, Universal
Jurisdiction, The Alien Tort Statute, and Transnational Public-Law Litigation
After Kiobel, 64 DUKE L.J. 1023 (2015).
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legislation reflect the predominance today of a more
nationalistic vision, in which the protection of U.S. nationals
and U.S. territory, and the effectiveness of U.S. foreign
policy, determine the role of federal courts in human rights
litigation.
This more nationalistic emphasis also helps explain how the
use of courts to vindicate human rights violations—
portrayed by the author of Filártiga as a noble endeavor
exemplifying the rule of law16—tends today to become little
more than another foreign policy instrument. Congress’s
interest in promoting such litigation is selective, to say the
least, focused on states or other actors that are out of favor
with U.S. foreign policy. The promotion of terrorism
litigation can also become a weapon to be used by Congress
in its struggles with the executive branch over control of
foreign policy, as the battles over the recently enacted Justice
Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA) show. 17 The
weaponization of judicial redress for severe human rights
violations disrespects the victims whose interests it claims to
vindicate and undercuts the integrity of the judicial process.
16 Irving R. Kaufman, A Legal Remedy for International Torture?, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Nov. 9, 1980, at 44.
17 Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 114-222 (2016).
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The developments of the last quarter century, then, suggest
two different visions of federal civil litigation over human
rights violations, one cosmopolitan, one nationalist. Each
vision has its legitimate attractions; each also gives cause for
concern. My aim here is not to provide a full evaluation, but
rather to suggest a possible third alternative. This alternative
situates federal civil litigation of human rights violations in a
context that recognizes the interconnectedness of the local
and the global, but without tying such litigation to a larger
project of building a global system of the rule of law.
One modest first step in such a direction would be to
question how “foreign” many of the ATS cases are. A closer
look at Paraguay, where Joelito Filártiga was tortured and
murdered, shows that the nomenclature of “foreign cubed”
attached to some cases—to those brought by foreign
plaintiffs against a foreign defendant for violations that
occurred in foreign territory—can be deeply misleading. The
United States’ global role often means that seemingly foreign
cases have more ties to the U.S. than might first be apparent.
This observation, in turn, might suggest a role for ATS
litigation that is not wedded to the cosmopolitan vision, in
which federal court adjudication of human rights violations
against foreigners helps build a global legal order. Instead,
ATS litigation may help raise awareness of the ways in
which U.S. policy can contribute to those violations in the
first place. For now, however, the turn to a more nationalist
vision – which Congress’s avid attention to anti-terrorism
legislation embodies – almost certainly precludes any revival
of the ATS.
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II. THE JUDICIARY AND HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION AS OF
1991: AN EXPANDING UNIVERSE
As of 1991, the prospects for civil litigation seeking to
vindicate human rights violations here and abroad seemed
bright. The revival of the ATS in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala was
still fresh, and had already inspired other lawsuits against
individual human rights violators. 18 In the 1990s, courts
approved legal theories of liability that expanded the
universe of potential defendants. Liability was upheld on the
basis of command responsibility—meaning that higher
officials, not just those who actually committed torture or
other human rights violations, could be held liable.
Additionally, liability was extended to private actors. This
liability covered private actors committing genocide or war
crimes, on the theory that no state action was required for
such violations. It also covered private actors committing
human rights violations that did require state action, if those
actors (primarily corporations) acted in concert with state
actors. In this latter category, there was no requirement that
the state be named as a defendant along with the private
18 E.g., Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (lawsuit
against Argentinian general for disappearance, torture, and summary
execution), on reconsideration, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988). See
BETH STEPHENS ET AL., INTERNATIONALHUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION INU.S.
COURTS 12-13 (2d ed. 2008). According to William Aceves, some 100 ATS
cases were filed between the Filártiga and Sosa cases. ACEVES, supra note
7, at 8 & n.37.
2017 TRANSFORMATION OFHUMAN RIGHTS 297
actor that had cooperated with the state in the commission of
human rights violations, meaning that foreign sovereign
immunity posed no barrier.19
Indeed, courts seemed willing to find exceptions to foreign
sovereign immunity in human rights cases brought directly
against states. In its 1991 decision in Nelson v. Saudi Arabia,
the Eleventh Circuit allowed an American recruited to work
at a Saudi government-owned hospital to sue Saudi Arabia
for torturing him, finding subject matter jurisdiction under
the “commercial activity” exception to foreign sovereign
immunity.20
Granted, not all these human rights lawsuits succeeded.
Courts did not accept every assertion of an alleged
international law norm, and other doctrines such as forum
non conveniens, act of state, political question, and comity
had to be considered, as well as questions of personal
jurisdiction. 21 Even before 1991, the D.C. Circuit’s 1984
19 For useful summaries, see STEPHENS, supra note 18, at 13-15; ACEVES,
supra note 7, at 91-158.
20 Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 923 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1991). Nelson, a U.S.
citizen, had been employed in Saudi Arabia by a Saudi government-
owned hospital. He brought suit against Saudi Arabia in federal district
court, asserting that the government had detained and tortured him in
response to whistleblowing. Id. at 1530.
21 See STEPHENS, supra note 18, at 15-16.
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decision in Tel-Oren had struck a cautionary note.22 And in
its 1989 decision in Amerada Hess, the Supreme Court had
rejected a sweeping attempt to strip foreign states of their
immunity to suit in human rights lawsuits alleging
violations of peremptory norms. 23 The Eleventh’s Circuit
decision in 1991 in Nelson v. Saudi Arabia was soon to be
reversed by the Supreme Court.24 There the Court read the
commercial activity exception to foreign sovereign
immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA)
very narrowly, in a way that foreclosed one basis for human
rights lawsuits against states.25
22 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
23 Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428
(1989).
24 Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993), rev’g, Nelson v. Saudi
Arabia, 923 F.2d 1528 (11th. Cir. 1991).
25 Id. Nelson, a U.S. citizen, had been employed in Saudi Arabia by a
Saudi government-owned hospital. He brought suit against Saudi Arabia
in federal district court, asserting that the government had detained and
tortured him in response to whistleblowing. Id.. at 352-53. Foreign states
have immunity from suit in federal courts unless one of the exceptions
provided in the FSIA applies. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Pub. L.
No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330,
1391(f), 1441(d), and 1602-11) (2012)) [hereinafter FSIA]. Nelson asserted
that his claim fell under the commercial activity exception of Section
1605(a)(2), because he was tortured for activities related to his
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Nevertheless, apart from litigation directly against states,
ATS litigation continually expanded. This expansion,
moreover, came in the context of what appeared to be a
decisive political break with the past practice of not ratifying
human rights treaties. In 1989, the U.S. finally became a
party to the Genocide Convention, four decades after
signing it. 26 As noted earlier, the U.S. also ratified the
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention in 1991, 27 the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in
1992, 28 and both the International Convention on the
employment contract. Nelson, 507 U.S. at 354. The Supreme Court held
that the violation of human rights was a sovereign act, not a commercial
one, and so was immune. Id. at 363.
26 See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S.
277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951; as to the United States, Feb. 23,
1989); see also Steven V. Roberts, Reagan Signs Bill Ratifying U.N. Genocide
Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1988.
27 Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, June 25, 1957,
S. Treaty Doc. No. 88-11, 320 U.N.T.S. 291.
28 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 U.S.T. 521,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force, Mar. 23, 1976).
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Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination29 and the
Convention against Torture30 in 1994.
Significantly, U.S. action went beyond simple ratification of
treaties. The Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) was
enacted in 1991.31 It provided a right of action for victims of
torture or extrajudicial killing by foreign officials (though
nothing else—and at the cost of raising questions about the
continuing viability of the ATS as a basis for torture and
extrajudicial killing claims 32 ). And it reinforced the U.S.
commitment to the obligations it took on through the
Convention Against Torture, which President Reagan had
signed in 1988.33
29 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969; as to the
United States, Oct. 21, 1994).
30 Convention Against Torture, supra note 10.
31 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73
(1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2012)).
32 See Ekaterina Apostolova, The Relationship between the Alien Tort Statute
and the Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 BERKELEY J. INT'L LAW 640, 643-52
(2010).
33 See 136 Cong. Rec. S17486 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (TVPA enacted in
anticipation of ratification of CAT, article 14 of which requires private
right of action for damages.); see also ACEVES, supra note 7, at 78-80; but
see text accompanying infra note 46. Additionally, when the Senate
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These developments, moreover, appeared to be a part of a
larger global transformation. The year 1991 saw the
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.
Addressing Congress as he sought to assemble an
international military coalition to force Iraq’s withdrawal
from Kuwait, President George H.W. Bush envisioned the
emergence of a “new world order.” 34 Nothing in this new
world order appeared to entail bringing democracy or
respect for human rights either to Iraq or to Kuwait, but
President Bush did speak of a world in which “the rule of
law supplants the rule of the jungle,” and “the strong respect
the rights of the weak.” 35 The “end of history” was
proclaimed as the liberal order was taken to have
triumphed—an order that could be depicted as uniquely
auspicious for the recognition of human rights law.36
approved ratification of CAT, Congress approved a new criminal statute
with an extraterritorial prohibition of torture. Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-236, § 506,
108 Stat. 382, 463 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340, 2340A (2012)).
34 Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf
Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit, Sept. 11, 1990, 2 PUBLIC PAPERS OF
THE PRESIDENTS OF THEUNITED STATES: GEORGE BUSH 1218, 1219 (1991).
35 Id.
36 See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OFHISTORY AND THE LASTMAN
(1992).
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The rise of ATS litigation could be seen as integrally bound
up with these developments. The judge who wrote the
opinion in Filártiga had sentenced the Rosenbergs to death in
an iconic Cold War prosecution, under circumstances that
may have made a mockery of the rule of law.37 Now he
helped usher in a new era in which the exercise of universal
jurisdiction would bring human rights violators around the
world to heel.
Legal academics saw ATS litigation as having broad
significance. Koh argued that in welcoming transnational
public litigation, U.S. courts would “shake the
idealist/realist polarities that dominated Cold War debate,”
38 and realize their unique potential to “play a more
constructive role in the international legal process.”39 Anne-
Marie Slaughter’s article on the ATS, published in 1989,
granted the statute pride of place among the nation’s
37 See Brad Snyder, Taking Great Cases: Lessons from the Rosenberg Case, 63
VAND. L. REV. 885, 896 (2010).
38 Koh, supra note 6, at 2399.
39 Id. at 2396; see also Harold Hongju Koh, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala: Judicial
Internalization into Domestic Law of the Customary International Law Norm
Against Torture, in INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES 45, 67-73 (John E. Noyes
et al. eds., 2007). The phrase, “international legal process,” reflected
Chayes’ adoption in the international law context of the Hart and Sacks’
legal process model. Koh, supra note 6, at 2398-99 & n.269.
2017 TRANSFORMATION OFHUMAN RIGHTS 303
founding documents as a “badge of honor.”40 The ATS, she
argued, represented more than an effort to avoid the
international embarrassments that might ensue from failing
to provide a judicial forum for aliens (including
ambassadors) who were mistreated within the U.S.41 Rather,
it represented the framers’ acknowledgment of “the nation’s
duty to propagate and enforce those international law rules
that directly regulated individual conduct”42—rules that the
framers understood to be dynamic and evolving over time.43
The impulse behind the statute, she argued, was not merely
prudential (though it was that), but something more: “The
Framers sought to uphold the law of nations as a moral
imperative—a matter of national honor.”44
To be sure, the outlook for ATS litigation was not entirely
rosy. There were already, even a quarter century ago, signs
of limitations and even push back. The Justice Department
under the Reagan administration had been notably hostile to
invocation of the ATS; the administration of George H.W.
40 Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789:
A Badge of Honor, 83 AMER. J. INT’L L. 461 (1989).
41 Id. at 465-74.
42 Id. at 475.
43 Id. at 477.
44 Id. at 482.
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Bush was less so, but hardly welcoming. 45 Multinational
corporations were obviously not happy with the expansion
of liability to private actors. Notably, when he signed the
TVPA, President Bush not only disagreed with Congress
about whether the legislation was required by the
Convention Against Torture,46 but also expressed concern
that suits by foreigner citizens over torture abroad would
embroil U.S. courts in sensitive foreign policy matters.47 And
conservative commentators denounced civil litigation of
foreign human rights violations in the strongest of terms.48
45 Jide Nzelibe, Contesting Adjudication: The Partisan Divide over Alien Tort
Statute Litigation, 33 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 475, 477, 506 (2013).
46 Compare Statement on Signing the Torture Victim Protection Act of
1991, March 12, 1992, 1 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THEUNITED
STATES: GEORGE BUSH 437, 437 (1993). (TVPA “does not help implement
the Torture Convention”) [hereinafter TVPA Signing Statement] with
Sen. Judiciary Comm., Report on the Torture Victim Protection Act of
1991 to accompany S. 313, as amended, S. Rep. No. 249, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991) (Convention obligates states to ensure legal accountability of
torturers and not to become a “safe haven” for torturers). In 1994,
Congress also approved a new criminal statute with an extraterritorial
prohibition of torture. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years
1994 and 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-236, § 506, 108 Stat. 382, 463 (April 30,
1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340, 2340A (2012)).
47 TVPA Signing Statement, supra note 46.
48 See Ranon Altman, Extraterritorial Application of the Alien Tort Statute
After Kiobel, 24 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 111, 116 (2016).
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Filártiga itself came under sharp criticism. Some argued that
the Second Circuit had simply gotten the statute wrong: the
ATS was simply jurisdictional and provided for no cause of
action at all, leaving it to Congress to specify causes of
actions through other statutes. Others argued that the statute
provided liability only for a highly limited set of offenses
that were recognized in 1789 as implicating individual
liability. Judge Bork’s opinion in Tel-Oren took up these
themes.49 The limiting interpretations of the ATS had gained
enough traction in the 1980s that a significant part of
Slaughter’s Badge of Honor article was devoted to critiquing
those theories. They had also gained enough traction to
make the insulation of torture and summary execution
claims from their effect one of the aims of human rights
advocates in pushing for enactment of the TVPA.50
The question of relief, moreover, remained problematic. In
ATS cases, judgments ranged from several hundred
thousand dollars to (in much rarer cases) judgments over a
billion dollars.51 Collecting on those judgments was another
49 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Bork, J., concurring).
50 See Beth Van Schaack, Finding the Tort of Terrorism in International Law,
28 REV. LITIG. 381, 388 & n.30 (2008).
51 Susan Simpson, Alien Tort Statute Cases Resulting in Plaintiff Victories,
THEVIEWFROMLL2 (Nov. 11, 2009),
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matter. Individual defendants might well not have assets
sufficient to cover the compensatory and punitive damages.
Corporate defendants might, but multinational corporations’
assets would likely be located in different countries, and the
defendants had ample resources to resist execution.
Judgments against foreign states posed another set of
problems. Vulnerability to suit under the FSIA does not
automatically entail loss of immunity to execution of
assets.52
In the Letelier case, for example, the Republic of Chile was
found liable for having assassinated a leading dissident
living in the U.S. 53 Foreign sovereign immunity did not
apply by virtue of the non-commercial tort exception set out
in section 1605(a)(5) of the FSIA. That section permits suit
against a state for “personal injury or death . . . occurring in
the United States” that is caused by an act or omission of the
https://viewfromll2.com/2009/11/11/alien-tort-statute-cases-resulting-
in-plaintiff-victories/ (updating compilation of damage awards through
March 2013).
52 See FSIA, supra note 25, § 1609 (granting states immunity from
execution of judgments except where the FSIA provides for an
exception); seeMona Conway, Terrorism, the Law and Politics as Usual: A
Comparison of Anti-Terrorism Legislation Before and After 9/11, 18 TOURO L.
REV. 735 (2002) (discussing the difficulties of executing judgments).
53 De Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 502 F. Supp. 259 (D.D.C. 1980).
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foreign state’s officials within the scope of their
employment.54 Plaintiffs were, however, unable to execute
against Chile’s national airline to satisfy the judgment. The
airline was a separate legal entity, and even if the court had
been willing to consider the airline otherwise, the
commercial activity exception did not apply.55 In general,
54 FSIA, supra note 25, § 1605(a)(5); see Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F.
Supp. 665, 669 (D.D.C. 1980). There is, in turn, an exception to this
exception to sovereign immunity—the FSIA does not remove immunity
for claims based on discretionary functions. FSIA, supra note 25,
§ 1605(a)(5)(A); but see Letelier, 488 F. Supp. at 673 (states have no
discretion to assassinate individuals).
55 FSIA, supra note 25, § 1610(a)(2) (allowing execution against the
property of a foreign state “used for a commercial activity in the United
States,” if that property “is or was used for the commercial activity upon
which the claim is based”). The Second Circuit held that even if the
airline, a commercial venture, was involved in the assassination of
Orlando Letelier and Ronnie Moffit, assassination is not a commercial
activity. De Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 797 (2d Cir. 1984)
(“Politically motivated assassinations are not traditionally the function of
private individuals.”). Ultimately an international arbitral panel
constituted under a 1914 Treaty for the Settlement of Disputes between
the U.S. and Chile awarded the victims’ families $2,611,892 in
compensation. Dispute Concerning Responsibility for the Deaths of Letelier
and Moffitt, XXV Rep. of Int’l Arb. Awards 1, 11 (Jan. 11, 1992). See
Barbara Crossette, $2.6 Million Awarded Families in Letelier Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 13, 1992, at A1. See also DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN
INTERNATIONALHUMAN RIGHTS LAW 149-51 (2015) (account of the
arbitration).
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though restrictions on execution leave plaintiffs in the
situation of a “right without a remedy,” 56 the moral
vindication of obtaining a ruling pronouncing a state to have
violated the plaintiff’s internationally guaranteed human
rights was still significant.
We should be careful, having the benefit of hindsight, not to
overstate the significance of these potential limits to the
revolution that Filártiga brought about. While there may
have been clouds on the horizon, they were just that: clouds.
There was no reason to suppose that the expansion of ATS
litigation would inevitably come to a halt, let alone be
reversed. Indeed, with the election of President Clinton in
1992, the executive branch took a much more favorable
stance toward ATS litigation.57 And in fact the coming years
were to witness an explosion of such litigation in federal
courts. The ATS went, as one commentator put it, from
obscurity to “an important emerging tool for human rights
advocates.” 58 Another observed in 2008 that “private
56 De Letelier, 748 F.2d at 799.
57 See Beth Stephens, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: “The Door Is Still Ajar” for
Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 533, 538-39
(2004-2005).
58 Derek Baxter, Protecting the Power of the Judiciary: Why the Use of State
Department Statements of Interest in Alien Tort Statute Litigation Runs Afoul
of Separation of Powers Concerns, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 807, 810 (2006).
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individuals, government officials, and multinational
corporations responsible for torture and other egregious
abuses may be required to defend their actions in court,”
and asserted that this litigation contributed to a “world in
which those who commit gross violations of human rights
are brought to justice swiftly, in whatever country they try to
hide.”59
There was, however, one area with decidedly mixed results:
civil lawsuits over alleged acts of terrorism. On the one
hand, most cases in which damages were sought for
terrorism failed, except where the act touched American soil.
(And even where a judgment was obtained, execution
remained a significant problem.) On the other hand,
advocates for victims of terrorism had recently scored a
major legislative success with the Antiterrorism Act of 1990
(ATA), reenacted in 1992.60 The ATA had serious limitations,
59 STEPHENS, supra note 18, at xxii.
60 Military Construction Appropriations Act of 1991, Pub. L. 101-519, 104
Stat. 2251, § 132 (Nov. 5, 1990); Federal Courts Administration Act of
1992, Pub. L. 102-572, title X, § 1003 (Oct. 29, 1992), (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2332-2338 (2012)). The 1990 enactment was flawed on
procedural grounds, and was repealed effective November 5, 1990. Dire
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
27, 105 Stat. 130, § 402 (April 10, 1991); seeMilitary Construction
Appropriations Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-136, 105 Stat. 643, § 126 (Oct.
25, 1991) (amending the Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
Act of 1991); see Senator Charles Grassley, 137 Cong. Rec. S4511 (1991).
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however, and ATA litigation was not to take hold until after
2000.61
Surprisingly, some of the most successful terrorism-oriented
claims were those brought against states. The Letelier case
against Chile, 62 Liu v. Republic of China, 63 and Estate of
The statute was re-enacted in largely the same form by Congress in 1992.
For more detailed explanations, see Jimmy Gurulé, Holding Banks Liable
Under the Anti-terrorism Act for Providing Financial Services to Terrorists: An
Ineffective Legal Remedy in Need of Reform, 41 J. LEGIS. 184, 187 n.18 (2015);
John G. McCarthy, The United States Should Prosecute Those Who Conspired
to Assassinate Former President Bush in Kuwait, 16 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
1330, 1341 n.69 (1992); Van Schaack, supra note 50, at 383 n.6. There is
also an earlier Anti-Terrorism Act enacted in 1987. It focuses expressly
on the PLO. Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, Publ. L. 100-204, 101 Stat. 1406
§§ 1001-105, (Dec. 22, 1987) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 5201-
5203(2012)). Whether one regards the ATA as having been enacted in
1990 or 1992 makes no difference to my analysis.
61 See Lanier Saperstein & Geoffrey Sant, The Antiterrorism Act: Bad Acts
Make Bad Law, 248 N.Y.L.J., No. 46 (Sept. 5, 2012).
62 The Letelier case resulted in a default judgment against Chile. De
Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 502 F. Supp. 259 (D.D.C. 1980). Chile
refused to pay the judgment for many years, and resisted efforts to
execute it, but under pressure from the U.S. ultimately agreed to a
binding determination by an international arbitral panel, which awarded
the plaintiffs $2.6 million. See ACEVES, supra note 7, at 88.
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Domingo v. Republic of the Philippines 64 illustrate one
approach. In all three cases, plaintiffs asserted claims against
foreign states for assassinating dissidents living in the U.S.
Sovereign immunity was held to be no barrier in these cases,
at least to judgment. To be sure, the cases did not assert
claims for “terrorism” as such; the plaintiffs asserted tort
claims under state law. Still, using violent means against
civilians in blatant violation of human rights law, for
political aims—i.e., not only to silence the dissidents
themselves but to intimidate the civilian population here or
back home—could plausibly be viewed as terrorism.65 This
63 Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989). The district
court dismissed the complaint in Liu on act of state grounds, but the
Ninth Circuit overturned that holding and remanded the case.
64 Estate of Domingo v. Republic of the Philippines, 694 F. Supp. 782
(W.D. Wash. 1988).
65 The ATA (not adopted as of the time of these lawsuits) defines
international terrorism as “violent acts or acts dangerous to human life”
that would violate U.S. law if committed here, and are intended, among
other things, to “intimidate or coerce a civilian population.” 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2331(1)(A), (B) (2012). The complaint in the Domingo case, for example,
asserted that the “murders were but one overt act of a broader tortious
conspiracy to surveil, harass and intimidate the class of anti-Marcos
Filipinos in the United States.” THOMASCHURCHILL, TRIUMPHOVER
MARCOS: A STORY BASED ON THE LIVES OFGENEVIERNES& SILME
DOMINGO 165 (1995) (quoting complaint). The claims against the
Republic of the Philippines appear not to have been pursued. In other
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route could work only because the harm occurred in the U.S.
As Letelier had done, Liu read section 1605(a)(5) of the FSIA
to permit suit against a state that caused death or personal
injury in the United States.66
Where the wrongful conduct and injuries occurred abroad,
on the other hand, there was little, if any, hope of a
successful claim. The long saga of attempts by those taken
hostage at the U.S. Embassy in Iran in 1979 is illustrative.
The first such effort failed, with the D.C. Circuit ruling that
Iran was immune from suit under the FSIA.67
contexts, a single assassination by a non-state actor has been so
characterized. See Boim v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and
Development, 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008).
66 Liu v. Republic of China, 642 F. Supp. 297, 305 (N.D. Cal. 1986), rev’d
on other grounds, 892 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989). As in Letelier, the court
held that there is no discretion to assassinate individuals. Liu, 892 F.2d at
1431. The claims against the Marcoses resulted in a jury verdict of more
than $15 million; the court had denied Ferdinand Marcos head of state
immunity. Estate of Domingo, 694 F. Supp. at 786 (W.D. Wash. 1988); see
also Marcoses Ruled Liable in Murders, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 17, 1989;
Marcos Allies Held Liable in Deaths of Foes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1990.
67 Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835 (D.D.C. 1984). For a
useful history of the efforts of the American hostages to bring claims
against Iran in federal court, see JENNIFERK. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R43210, THE IRANHOSTAGES: EFFORTS TOOBTAINCOMPENSATION
(2015). It is not enough, moreover, that the injury was said to have
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In other cases, plaintiffs sought relief against non-state
actors, asserting claims under international law. Although
non-state actors were held not to enjoy sovereign
immunity,68 these lawsuits were largely unsuccessful.69 The
most notable was Tel-Oren, which arose out of an armed
attack against civilians in Israel by members of the Palestine
Liberation Organization in 1978. Israeli survivors of the
attack and relatives of the victims brought suit under the
ATS and other statutes against Libya, the PLO, and related
organizations.70 Citing the ATS, the plaintiffs asserted that
the defendants’ actions violated international law norms
against genocide, terrorism, and torture. The D.C. Circuit
was unanimous in upholding the lower court’s dismissal of
occurred in the U.S. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping
Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
68 See Klinghoffer v. PLO, 937 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1991).
69 Another possibility was to sue private actors under domestic law.
Relatives of those killed in the Pan Am 103 bombing sued Pan Am,
asserting it had been negligent in protecting them from the risk of a
terrorist bombing. In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on December
21, 1988, 37 F.3d 804 (2d Cir. 1994). This route left the underlying
perpetrators untouched.
70 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(per curiam).
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the complaint, but was unable to agree on a rationale.71
Judge Edwards doubted the ATS could ever apply to non-
state actors. 72 Judge Bork depicted the statute as solely
reflecting a Congressional concern for “peaceful relations
with other nations,” and would have read it as limited to
offenses recognized under the law of nations in 1789. 73
Along with Judge Bork, Judge Robb considered lawsuits
asserting terrorism as a human rights violation to present
non-justiciable political questions.74 Judge Bork’s view was
the most sweeping, applying potentially to all human rights
claims; Judge Robb’s and Judge Edwards’s views would
have their greatest impact on claims against non-state actors
arising out of terrorist activity.
Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan involved a claim based on U.S.
funding of terrorist activities by the contras.75 It met with no
71 Id.
72 Id. at 776 (Edwards, J., concurring). He did not address the question of
Libya’s sovereign immunity.
73 See id. at 803; id. at 816 (Bork, J., concurring).
74 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 823-26 (Robb, J.,
concurring); id. at 801-805 (Bork, J., concurring). Given their views on the
lack of a justiciable claim, neither judge addressed the question of
Libya’s sovereign immunity.
75Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983), aff’d, 770
F.2d 202 (D.C. 1985).
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more success than had the claims in Tel-Oren. The District
Court ruled that the case presented a non-justiciable political
question;76 the D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal on other
grounds, expressing doubt, among other things, that the
ATS could apply to the actions of non-state actors.77
In sum, while the prospects for the federal civil litigation of
human rights violations appeared strong—prospects often
tied to the emergence of a global legal order vindicating
human rights—the future of lawsuits over terrorist activity
appeared far less certain in 1991.
III. THE JUDICIARY AND HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION
TODAY
A quarter century later, the Supreme Court’s two encounters
with the ATS have left it stunted. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the
first, concerned a claim under the ATS brought by Alvarez, a
Mexican national, against Sosa, also a Mexican national.
Alvarez accused Sosa of having arbitrarily arrested and
detained him as part of a U.S.-sponsored plan to kidnap him
76 Id. at 599-602.
77 Id. at 206-07. Sanchez-Espinoza is indicative of another feature of civil
litigation of human rights violations—namely, its tendency to be
unsuccessful when the defendants are U.S. officials. For a useful analysis
of ATS cases challenging U.S. conduct, see Julian G. Ku, The Third Wave:
The Alien Tort Statute and the War on Terrorism, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 105
(2005).
U.MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 24316
and bring him to the U.S. for trial after the Mexican
government had denied extradition.78 The Court held that
the conduct alleged did not contravene a “specific, universal,
and obligatory” norm of international law. The Court did
not provide a general test of what might so qualify,79 but it
suggested it might consider an allegation of prolonged
arbitrary detention to do so, unlike the briefer detention
overnight, before Alvarez was taken to the U.S. The Court
expressed concern that every brief detention of a foreigner
by a foreign police officer abroad could provide the basis for
a claim in U.S. courts under the statute. In so doing, it
overlooked the clear-cut practical and doctrinal barriers—
including forum non conveniens and the need to achieve
personal service—that made this specter largely theoretical.
In any event, as was recognized at the time, and as
subsequent application by lower courts demonstrated, Sosa
78 Alvarez also filed a claim against the U.S. Government under the
Federal Tort Claims Act. The Court found that claim to be covered by a
provision of the FTCA forbidding claims “arising in a foreign country.”
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 700 (2004).
79 For one such effort, see William J. Moon, The Original Meaning of the
Law of Nations, 56 VA. J. INT’L L. 51 (2016) (arguing that only peremptory
norms should provide the basis for claims under the ATS).
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proved far from a death knell for human rights litigation
under the ATS.80
The same cannot be said of the Court’s second encounter
with the ATS. In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,81 twelve
Nigerians sued three oil companies, none of them U.S.-
based, claiming that the companies had sought the help of
the Nigerian government in brutally putting down
resistance to oil exploration in the Ogoni region of Nigeria.
The Second Circuit, which had led the way in Filártiga, held
that international law simply does not govern the conduct of
corporations, potentially eliminating an entire field of
human rights litigation.82 Given the opportunity to review
80 See Stephens, supra note 57; Ralph Steinhardt, Non-State Actors and the
Alien Tort Claims Act, in JOHNNORTONMOORE, ED., FOREIGNAFFAIRS
LITIGATION INUNITED STATESCOURTS 89, 93 (2013).
81 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1660 (2013).
82 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 145, 151 (2d Cir.
2010), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). See, e.g., Joe Lodico, Corporate Aiding
and Abetting Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute, 30 J.L. & COM. 117, 127-
29 (2011) (arguing for corporate liability under ATS); Theresa (Maxi)
Adamski, The Alien Tort Claims Act and Corporate Liability: A Threat to the
United States’ International Relations, 34 FORD. INT’L L.J. 1502, 1542 (2011)
(arguing that such liability constitutes “judicial imperialism”). For an
argument that the most common framing of the issue—whether
corporations are subjects of international law, or have international legal
personhood—is misguided, see José E. Alvarez, Are Corporations
“Subjects” of International Law, 9 SANTACLARA J. INT’L L. 1 (2011).
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that decision, the Supreme Court vastly expanded the
question before it, 83 and for the first time applied the
presumption against extraterritoriality to the ATS.84
The Court went on to hold that the presumption had not
been overcome, reading the statute as primarily concerned
with international law claims by aliens that arose from
conduct within the U.S. In Kiobel, the Court held, “all the
relevant conduct took place outside the United States,”85 and
so did not fall within the statute. The Court further added, in
Delphic language, that “even where the claims touch and
concern the territory of the United States, they must do so
with sufficient fore to displace the presumption against
extraterritorial application.”86 The Court also cautioned that
83 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1660 (2013).
84 Id. at 1661. The Supreme Court did not decide the question of
corporate liability under international law. Other circuits have rejected
the Second Circuit’s holding on this point. See Altman, supra note 48, at
114 & n.16. In April 2017, the Court granted certiorari in a Second Circuit
case squarely raising the issue. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 2017 WL
1199472 (No. 16-499) (April 3, 2017).
85 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
86 Id. It is not clear, for example, whether domestic law or international
law provides the rules that determine what “touches and concerns” U.S.
territory. For an argument in favor of international law, see Anthony J.
Colangelo, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations in Kiobel and
Beyond, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1329 (2013).
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“mere corporate presence” in the U.S. would not suffice to
overcome the presumption.87 Speaking more generally, the
Court viewed any judicial resolution of human rights
violations that took place in foreign territory as raising
unacceptable risks of drawing the U.S. into contentious
disputes with foreign governments.88
The potential implications of Kiobel are sweeping. 89
Commentators have suggested that a whole category of
claims—so-called foreign cubed cases brought by foreign
plaintiffs against foreign corporations for violations
abroad90—may well be discarded. Indeed, the assertion that
87 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1670.
88 For a critique of the view that judicial resolution of ATS cases poses
significant foreign policy risks, see Robert Knowles, A Realist Defense of
the Alien Tort Statute, 88 WASH. U.L. REV. 1117 (2011).
89 The same might be said of other proposed limitations on the scope of
the ATS. The denial of any corporate responsibility under international
law would be one. See text accompanying supra note 82. A limitation of
potential defendants to U.S. citizens (a limitation not accepted by the
courts today) would be another. See Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R.
Clark, Two Myths About the Alien Tort Statute, 89 NOTREDAME L. REV.
1609 (2014).
90 See, e.g., Caroline Kaeb & David Scheffer, The Paradox of Kiobel in
Europe, 107 Amer. J. Int’l L. 852, 854 (2013); Oona
Hathaway, Kiobel Commentary: The door remains open to “foreign
squared” cases, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 18, 2013, 4:27 PM),
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“all the relevant conduct took place outside the United
States” could easily be made of Filártiga itself, at least as it is
commonly portrayed. While the Court did not address the
continuing validity of the decision, the logic of Kiobel could
be fatal to it.91 Filártiga involved federal courts adjudicating
the legality of actions by Paraguayan officials with respect to
Paraguayan officials in Paraguay.92
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/kiobel-commentary-the-door-
remains-open-to-foreign-squared-cases/. The phrase is used in other
non-ATS contexts as well, e.g., Michael P. Murtagh, The Rule 23(b)(3)
Superiority Requirements and Transnational Class Actions: Excluding
Foreign Class Members in Favor of European Remedies, 34 Hastings Int’l
& Comp. L. Rev. 1, 1 (2011), but my remarks here are confined to the
ATS context.
91 SeeWarfaa v. Ali, 811 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 2016) (Kiobel and Sosa
“have significantly limited, if not rejected, the applicability of the
Filártiga regime”), petition for cert filed, June 6, 2016. In Warfaa, the
plaintiff, Farhan Warfaa, alleged that Somali soldiers had kidnapped and
tortured him there. Later, Yusuf Ali, the colonel whom Warfaa claimed
had ordered the torture, moved to the United States, and Warfaa brought
suit under the ATS and the TVPA. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of the ATS claim. Of particular significance is the court’s
statement that under Kiobel, “[m]ere happenstance of residency, lacking
any connection to the relevant conduct, is not a cognizable consideration
in the ATS context.” Id. at 661.
92 To be sure, Justice Breyer, with the concurrence of three other Justices,
enunciated a broader test that would save Filártiga from complete
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What accounts for this Court’s inhospitable approach to the
ATS? One explanation is that the Court is simply following
the lead of the political branches. This explanation might
seem surprising at first glance, as the attitude of the political
branches has varied greatly over the years. In 1991,
Congress, as noted earlier, showed its support of federal
civil remedies for human rights violations abroad by
enacting the TVPA, partly in response to the push for
oblivion. Even accepting for the sake of argument that the presumption
against extraterritoriality would apply, he argued, it should be overcome
in three circumstances:
(1) the alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2) the defendant is an
American national, or (3) the defendant’s conduct substantially and
adversely affects an important American national interest, and that
includes a distinct interest in preventing the United States from
becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a
torturer or other common enemy of mankind.
Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring). The third would save the
specific circumstances of Filártiga, since the defendant was living in the
United States.
Further, there might be other avenues for civil litigation of human
rights violations, in both federal and state court, though they have their
limitations. See Gregory H. Fox & Yunjoo Goze, International Human
Rights Litigation After Kiobel, 92-NOVMICH. B.J. 44 (2013) (suggesting
federal question jurisdiction and federal common law, or state court
actions).
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narrowing interpretations of the ATS. Today, in contrast,
there is virtually no prospect of Congressional action to
counter application of the presumption against
extraterritoriality as determined in Kiobel.
Presidential administrations have also varied in outlook.93
As noted earlier, the Reagan and first Bush administrations
favored narrow interpretations of the ATS, the Reagan
administration especially so. The Clinton administration
proved more amenable to the ATS, supporting adjudication
of the claims brought in Karadzic94 and Doe I v. Unocal Corp.95
The second Bush administration returned the executive
branch to a position of hostility, arguing that the ATS was
jurisdictional and nothing more, and submitting statements
of interests in ATS cases arguing for dismissal on the ground
that adjudication of the claims would interfere with the
93 Nzelibe provides an informative account of how the attitudes of
Democratic and Republican administrations to ATS litigation have
varied over the years. The partisan divide over ATS litigation is real.
Nzelibe, supra note 45. The hostility of Congress and the executive
branch to the judicial application of human rights law, however, has
been largely invariant.
94 Beth Stephens, Judicial Deference and the Unreasonable Views of the Bush
Administration, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 773, 791-92 (2008).
95 See Baxter, supra note 58, at 813.
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conduct of foreign policy.96 The Obama administration has
been less unwelcoming, though it filed an amicus brief
arguing that the claims in Kiobel were beyond the scope of
the ATS.97
These shifts, while not unimportant, belie a deeper and
longer-term consensus in the political sphere. In practice,
across parties and administrations, the U.S. has treated
human rights largely as a matter of foreign relations policy,
not as universally applicable law. Nowhere is this approach
clearer than in its approach to ratification of human rights
treaties. When the U.S. becomes a party to human rights
treaties, one argument the proponents of ratification
consistently make is that ratification is vitally important to
the credibility of U.S. pressure on other countries to respect
human rights. At the same time, the terms of U.S. ratification
have been consistently structured to ensure that it has little
or no domestic legal impact. Before submission of the treaty
to the Senate, the State Department identifies conflicts
96 See id. at 811-815.
97 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491),
2011 WL 6425363. For a very critical take on the Obama administration’s
approach, see Hannibal Travis, Reparations for Mass Atrocities as a Path to
Peace: After Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Can Victims See Relief at
the International Criminal Court?, 40 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 547, 576-85 (2015).
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between the text of the treaty and current U.S. law and
practice and formulates reservations and understandings
aimed at conforming the treaty obligations the U.S. takes on
with current U.S. law. A declaration that the treaty is non-
self-executing is added—and no implementing legislation is
taken up. A somewhat cryptic federalism declaration is
added for good measure.98
It is no wonder that then-Senator Kerry, Chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, expressed incredulity
that any of his colleagues would hesitate to support
ratification of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities.99 Characterizing the treaty, he spoke of “words
or suggestions that have no power, that cannot be
implemented, that have no access to the courts, that have no
effect on the law of the United States, and cannot change the
law of the United States.”100 A description of a treaty in less
law-like terms could hardly be imagined.
98 See Penny M. Venetis, Making Human Rights Treaty Law Actionable in the
United States: The Case for Universal Implementing Legislation, 63 ALA. L.
REV. 97, 99-110 (2011).
99 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006,
2515 U.N.T.S.3.
100 Mike Lee, If the U.N. Convention Won’t Affect U.S. Laws, How Can It
Change Other Nations?, USA TODAY, Dec. 6, 2012 (op-ed) (quoting Sen.
Kerry’s remarks). See alsoMichael Mathes, US Senate Fails to Ratify UN
2017 TRANSFORMATION OFHUMAN RIGHTS 325
The Court’s approach to international law generally is
consistent with this deeper political consensus. Increasingly,
the Court treats international law as something to avoid as a
basis of decision, if at all possible, out of a concern that it is
an area better left to the political branches. In Sosa, Justice
Souter clearly articulated the case for judicial caution in the
Treaty on Disabilities, RSN, Dec. 5, 2012
http://readersupportednews.org/news-section2/328-121/14866-us-
senate-fails-to-ratify-un-treaty-on-disabilities (“‘It doesn’t require any
changes to American law, zero,’ Kerry said. ‘This has no tying of the
hands of America, there isn’t one law of the United States that would be
negatively affected.’”). Later testifying as Secretary of State when the
treaty was again up for ratification, Kerry made a similar argument,
arguing that it would only be other countries who had to change their
laws and practices, given that the U.S. already embodies the “gold
standard.” Penny Starr, Kerry on U.N. Disabilities Treaty: ‘No Impact
Whatsoever On the Sovereignty of the United States,’ CNSNews.com, Nov.
22, 2013, http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/penny-starr/kerry-
un-disabilities-treaty-no-impact-whatsoever-sovereignty-united-states
(“joining this treaty doesn’t require a change to U.S. law, and there’s no
reach whatsoever by any committee or any entity outside—the one
committee that exists within the framework of this treaty is allowed to
suggest things, but they have no power to enforce, no power to
compel”). See also Eric Chung, The Judicial Enforceability and Legal Effects of
Treaty Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations, 126 YALE L.J. 170,
173-74 (2016) (noting concerns of Senators to ensure that Disabilities
Convention, if ratified, have no domestic legal effect).
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face of Congress’s persistent signaling of its distaste for the
domestic judicial application of human rights treaties.101
The Court’s attention to those signals is not limited to ATS
litigation, but shows up in a number of spheres. One is the
Court’s much-remarked references to international and
foreign law in several juvenile justice cases. Those cases are
notable mainly for how reluctant the Court seems to be to
treat international human rights law as something the courts
can apply. It is true that in striking down the juvenile death
penalty and severely limiting the availability of life without
parole for juvenile defendants, the Court discussed
international law, foreign law, and the practices of other
nations.102 But the Court lumped those three rather different
phenomena together, without any sharp distinction among
them—hardly a sign of engagement with international law
101 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 694 (2004). For critiques of the
distaste for judicial application of human rights law, see, e.g., Louis
Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator
Bricker, 89 AMER. J. INT’L L. 341 (1995); Kenneth Roth, The Charade of US
Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 347
(2000), http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol1/iss2/14; for a
defense, see Curtis A. Bradley, The United States and Human Rights
Treaties: Race Relations, the Cold War, and Constitutionalism, 9 CHINESE J.
INT’L L. 321 (2010).
102 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48, 51 (2010), Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2487 (2012).
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as law. And in Graham it made clear that international law
could at most be referred to confirm an interpretation of the
Constitution reached by other means.103
Consider also the holding in Kiobel. The idea of applying a
presumption against extraterritoriality to the ATS—a statute
that provides jurisdiction for claims based in international
law, and which contemplates only foreign plaintiffs—is
striking, to say the least. But it reflects the thrust of the
Court’s other major recent decisions on extraterritoriality,
which emphasize the dangers of judicial involvement in
issues that might offend foreign national governments and
thereby complicate the conduct of foreign relations matters
by the president and congress.104
Medellín v. Texas provides another example of the Court
going out of its way to place treaty questions in the political
branches.105 Texas had convicted Medellín for murder and
sentenced him to death without complying with the
requirements of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations.106 The International Court of Justice held that the
103 Graham, 560 U.S. at 88.
104 E.g., RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2107 (2016).
105 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
106 Medellin, 552 U.S. at 503; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679.
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U.S. had violated the Convention, and ruled that he and
others who had similarly suffered violations be afforded the
opportunity to have a review of their convictions and
sentences, even if applicable domestic procedural law would
otherwise bar such review. President Bush issued a
memorandum effectively directing state courts to give effect
to the ICJ’s decision. Texas courts declined to do so, and
Medellín sought review before the Supreme Court. One
question before the Court was whether Article 94 of the U.N.
Charter, which obligates member states to comply with ICJ
judgments, is self-executing. Reasonable people might come
to different interpretations on this issue, as the disagreement
on this point between Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer
demonstrates.107 But the majority’s approach goes beyond
reason. It demands that the treaty itself provide clear
language in favor of self-execution. As others have pointed
out,108 that is a nonsensical test. The interest of state parties
107 Medellin, 562 U.S. at 522-23; id. at 562-63 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
108 Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy
Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 635,
640 (2008); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing
Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 695, 714-18 (1995); Curtis A. Bradley, Self-
Execution and Treaty Duality, 2008 SUPREMECOURT REVIEW 131, 133 (“the
relevant intent is that of the U.S. treatymakers (i.e., the Senate and
President), not the collective intent of the treaty parties”). Bradley
defendsMedellin’s reference to the treaty text on the theory that it does
show what the treatymakers agreed to. Id. at 155 (“Treaty text is relevant
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to a treaty lies in compliance, not in whether that compliance
comes about as a result of judicial implementation, executive
action, legislation, or some combination of them. Indeed,
national legal systems differ; some do not recognize self-
execution at all. If taken seriously, the Court’s test would
mean, as a practical matter, that in the U.S. no treaty is self-
executing unless the Senate expressly so provides.
A final example stems from the first appearance of the
Alvarez-Machain case. Alvarez challenged the power of the
government to bring him to criminal trial in the U.S. by
kidnapping him. In ruling that the manner in which he was
brought to the U.S. was irrelevant to the power to try him,
the Supreme Court went so far as to reject any assertion that
kidnapping Alvarez after the Mexican courts had denied
under this approach because it is what the Senate and President
specifically approve when agreeing to the treaty, just as statutory text is
relevant in discerning congressional intent with respect to whether and
to what extent a statute is to be judicially enforceable”). But since the text
of a treaty (especially a multilateral treaty) relates to a number of
domestic legal systems with different rules regarding what it takes to
make a treaty domestically enforceable, a textual approach effectively
amounts to a presumption against self-execution—a presumption likely
to be overcome only if the Senate expressly states at the time it gives its
consent to ratification that it regards the treaty as self-execution. For a
useful collection of commentary, see Venetis, supra note 98, at 112 n.89.
For a helpful analysis ofMedellin’s effect, see id. at 110-16.
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extradition in any way violated the U.S.-Mexico extradition
treaty.109 It is scarcely reasonable to imagine that a state
ratifying an extradition treaty would regard the treaty as
permitting the other party to respond to a denial of
extradition by kidnapping the individual whose extradition
has been unsuccessfully requested. 110 This strange
interpretation of a treaty did, however, leave the breach of
obligations undertaken in a treaty with Mexico entirely to
the executive branch’s discretion.
It would be mistaken, however, to view the Court as simply
following the lead of the political branches. One senses in
the Court’s rulings something more: an aversion to domestic
implementation of human rights norms, by any branch of
the federal government. Again, Medellín provides a telling
example. Having held that the treaty is not self-executing,
the Court turned to whether the president’s memorandum
obligated Texas courts to review Medellín’s conviction. The
109 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 659-70 (1992). The
following year, the prosecution ended with a grant by the District Court
of a motion for a judgment of acquittal. See United States v. Alvarez-
Machain, 971 F.2d 310, 311 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended Nov. 3, 1992.
110 See Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, art. 31(1), May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose.”).
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Court held that it did not.111 One might have thought that
under the familiar three-part test that Justice Jackson laid out
in Youngstown the president’s power would have been
upheld. He was acting with the support of the legislative
branch, which had after all consented to ratification of the
U.N. Charter; thus the president would seem to have been
acting at the maximum of his powers, and only a
constitutional limitation that stripped the federal
government of any power to enforce the treaty would have
negated his power. Instead, the Court treated the Senate’s
inaction—its failure to enact implementing legislation—as
an expression of opposition to presidential action to
implement the treaty. This placed the president’s power in
the category under least favorable to upholding president
power under Jackson’s schema. This implausible
understanding of the domestic legal significance of ratifying
a treaty that the Court later deems non-self-executing is hard
to understand other than as a strong judicial presumption
against any domestic application of treaties.
Bond v. United States112 provides another example. There was
speculation before the decision that the Court might subject
the Congressional power to implement treaties to federalism
111 Medellin, 552 U.S. at 536.
112 Bond v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 2077 (2014).
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constraints, overturning Missouri v. Holland.113 It did not, but
just as the Court gave a clear signal in its 2009 decision in
NAMUDNO that it would eviscerate the pre-clearance
requirement of the Voting Rights Act the next time the
matter the matter came before it,114 so Bond reads like a
portent of future ruling overturning Missouri v. Holland.115 In
both NAMUDNO and Bond, the Court adopted a highly
strained reading of a statute to avoid what it made clear
were, in its view, serious constitutional problems.116 That the
Court would seriously consider overruling Missouri v.
Holland is striking, to say the least—especially as it concerns
human rights treaties. To subject Congress’s power to
implement human rights treaties to federalism limits would
be to enter uncharted territory. But in the context of the
113 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
114 Northwest Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193
(2009).
115 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2088.
116 See Eric S. Fish, Constitutional Avoidance as Interpretation and as Remedy,
114 MICH. L. REV. 1275, 1308 (2016) (in NAMUDNO, “implausible
reading of the statute”); Jonathan H. Adler, Anti-Disruption Statutory
Construction, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 101, 109 (2016) (“strained and scarcely
plausible interpretation”). As to the statute at issue in Bond, see id. at 112
(“implausible”); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Bond v. United States:
Concurring in the Judgment, 2014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 285, 287 (2014)
(“dodgy”).
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Court’s federalism revival—a revival so strong it dealt
severe blows to a landmark statute implementing the
Fifteenth Amendment and to the major domestic
achievement of President Obama’s first term—there are
good reasons to think that there would be occasions when
the national government was powerless to ensure
compliance with human rights treaties in the face of
recalcitrant state governments. Medellín itself suggests one
set of facts. The Texas courts declined to give effect to the ICJ
ruling, notwithstanding the U.S. treaty commitment to do so.
In theory, the Court’s objection was simply that Congress
had not acted to implement that treaty obligation. But while
the Court’s federalism jurisprudence is not straightforward,
it is worth noting that criminal law is one area the Court has
pronounced local in its federalism decisions, in part on the
ground that it is not a commercial matter. Thus the Court’s
own federalism jurisprudence might preclude Congress
from giving the President the power to implement the ICJ
ruling.
Through a combination of deference to the political branches
and the Court’s own inclinations, then, the landscape for
civil litigation of foreign human rights violations has
changed dramatically since 1991. This change, however, is
not entirely in the direction of retrenchment. On the
contrary, there has been one major growth area unaffected
by the Sosa and Kiobel: litigation in U.S. courts by U.S.
victims of foreign terrorism.
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IV. THE GROWTH OF ANTI-TERRORISM LITIGATION
The range of potential responses to terrorism is, of course,
quite broad, encompassing resort to military force,
surveillance of communications, and banking regulations
targeting the funding of terrorist activities, among others.
With dramatic instances of terrorism abroad in the 1980s—
particularly the hijacking of the Achille Lauro and the
bombing of Pan Am flight 103—Congress began to focus on
adding civil litigation by victims of terrorism to the panoply
of responses.117 What had been, as noted earlier, a highly
uncertain set of prospects for civil litigation over terrorism
began to change significantly.
117 See ACEVES, supra note 7, at 83-84. Particularly useful accounts of the
development of the statutes can be found in Steven R. Perles and
Edward B. MacAllister, Policy Options for the Obama Administration:
Enforcement Provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act as a Tool
Against State Sponsors of Terrorism, in JOHNNORTONMOORE, ED., FOREIGN
AFFAIRS LITIGATION INUNITED STATESCOURTS 21 (2013); Royce C.
Lamberth, The Role of Courts in Foreign Affairs, in MOORE, supra, at 3. For a
useful description of remedies not based on litigation, see Deborah M.
Mostaghel,Wrong Place, Wrong Time, Unfair Treatment? Aid to Victims of
Terrorist Attacks, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 83, 103 (2001).
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A. THE ANTITERRORISM ACT AND THE FOREIGN
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIESACT
1. THE ANTITERRORISM ACT (ATA)
As noted earlier, Congress approved a civil remedy for
victims of terrorism through the ATA. 118 It provides
jurisdiction in the federal courts for a claim by U.S. nationals
for injury arising “by reason of an act of international
terrorism.”119 The ATA defines “international terrorism” as
violent or dangerous acts that violate U.S. criminal law (or
would if U.S. criminal law applied), and which are intended
to intimidate or coerce a civilian population or influence
government policy or affect government conduct.120 Only
activities that occur primarily outside the U.S. or which
“transcend national boundaries” are covered by the Act.121
118 See supra note 60. For a useful analysis of the ATA and the FSIA, see
Van Schaack, supra note 50, at 385-406. See also Gurulé, supra note 60
(analyzing bank liability under the statute); .
119 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2012).
120 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2012). Section 2331(1)’s definition of international
terrorism was amended in 2001 by the PATRIOT Act, Pub.L. No. 107-56,
§ 802(a)(1), 115 Stat. 272, 376. It should be noted that U.S. law contains a
number of definitions of terrorism; the ATA’s is one among many. See
Nicholas J. Perry, The Numerous Federal Legal Definitions of Terrorism: The
Problem of Many Grails, 30 J. LEGIS. 249 (2004).
121 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(C) (2012).
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The ATA provides for treble damages, attorneys’ fees, and
costs (but not punitive damages). 122 The treble damages
provision could make it easier for victims to secure counsel,
and was also said to fight terrorism by attacking its
funding.123
What is notable in the first instance is the distinction drawn
between terrorism at home and terrorism abroad (or
“transcend[ing] national boundaries”); the ATA covers only
the latter, insofar as civil liability is concerned. 124 As
122 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2012).
123 Mostaghel, supra note 117, at 101-02 (citing Senate report). The ATA
also provided for a four-year statute of limitations. Federal Courts
Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-572, title X, § 1003(a)(2) (Oct. 29,
1992), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2335 (2012). In 2013, Congress amended the
ATA to provide for a ten-year period in general. See National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 1251(a), 126
Stat. 1632 (Jan. 2, 2013), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2335 (2012). In a sign of
Congress’ close attention to pending cases and claims, however, it also
provided a “Special Rule Relating to Certain Acts of International
Terrorism,” by which ATA claims for international terrorism occurring
between September 11, 2001 and January 2, 2009) would be timely if filed
by Jan. 2, 2019. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 1251(c), 126 Stat. 1632 (Jan. 2, 2013) (not
codified).
124 SeeMargaret K. Lewis,When Foreign Is Criminal, 55 VA. J. INT’L L. 625,
666-72 (2015). The PATRIOT Act added a definition of “domestic
terrorism” to the ATA. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
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Margaret Lewis notes, codifying foreignness poses risks of
polarization and suspicion of others.125 Many if not most
other nations’ laws do not draw such a fundamental
distinction.126 Yet it pervades U.S. anti-terrorism law, on the
criminal as well as civil side.127 In this respect, anti-terrorism
law mirrors a more general trend for extraterritorial
application of U.S. criminal law to make culpability
specifically turn on the presence of a foreign element.128 In
some instances, this approach is hardly surprising (as with
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA
PATRIOT Act) Act Of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56, § 802(a)(4) (Oct. 26, 2001),
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (2012). But it did not provide for a civil
remedy for victims of domestic terrorism. It did make limited provision
for compensation for victims of terrorism under the Victims of Crime Act
of 1984. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. 107-56, § 624 (a) (Oct. 26, 2001).
125 Lewis, supra note 124, at 679-83.
126 Keiran Hardy & George Williams,What is “Terrorism”? Assessing
Domestic Legal Definitions, 16 U.C.L.A. INT’L L. & FOREIGNAFF. 77, 156
(2011).
127 Lewis, supra note 124, at 666-72.
128 Id. at 638-72.
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piracy 129 ); in other instances, very much so (as with
torture).130
A second notable feature is the complete absence of any
reference in the statute to international law. Terrorism is
expressly defined in U.S. law terms, which suggests that
courts should also resolve legal issues not expressly
addressed (whether there is any state of mind requirement,
for example) in terms of U.S. law.131 This stands in contrast
to the ATS, with its reference to torts “committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.”132 To be sure, the substance of the ATA’s definition
reflects elements common in discussions of the international
legal provisions on terrorism, and included in some treaties,
such as the intent to intimidate or coerce civilian
129 Id. at 643-45.
130 U.S. law criminalizes torture that takes place outside the U.S., but not
within it. To be sure, acts that constitute torture, if undertaken within the
U.S., may constitute criminal offenses, but not for “torture.” Id. at 653-55.
As Lewis points out, many other nations criminalize torture regardless of
where it occurs. Id. at 655.
131 JASTA, enacted in 2016, is clear on this point, commending to courts
faced with determining the scope of secondary liability a case about a
murder committed in the course of a burglary in Washington, D.C. See
note 239 infra.
132 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
2017 TRANSFORMATION OFHUMAN RIGHTS 339
populations.133 And Congress might have thought it better to
specify the definition of terrorism and the terms of liability
than to rely on a uncertain provisions of international law.134
Still, the ATA can easily be seen as a lack of interest on
Congress’s part in embedding federal civil adjudication of
international terrorism claims in any larger global legal
order.
The ATA resolved some legal issues and left others unclear,
which may be why it had so little impact for more than a
decade after its passage.135 A few aspects were clear from the
133 See Reuven Young, Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a
Legal Concept in International Law and Its Influence on Definitions in
Domestic Legislation, 29 BOSTONCOLLEGE INT’L&COMP. L. REV. 23, 52-53,
56-57, 91-93 (2006).
134 One might even read Congress’s silence on some issues as a deliberate
stance. For example, there is nothing in the text of the ATA that makes
relevant the question of whether the violence was committed in the
context of a national liberation struggle, or was inconsistent with
international humanitarian law. In reality, though, there is little if any
evidence that Congress gave any thought to international law in drafting
the ATA, or other anti-terrorism provisions for that matter. This is
Young’s conclusion with respect to U.S. criminal statutes regarding
terrorism. See Young, supra note 133, at 80; see also id. at 76-80.
135 See Geoffrey Sant, So Banks Are Terrorists Now? The Misuse of the Civil
Suit Provision of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 533, 545-46 (2013);
Saperstein and Sant, supra note 61; Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC, 893 F. Supp.
2d 542, 553 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Like a civil RICO claim, a suit for damages
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start. It specifies who may be a plaintiff—only U.S.
nationals—and it puts no limitation on who may be a
defendant, apart from one important provision. Section 2337
prohibits suits under the ATA against the U.S. or foreign
states or their officials acting in their official capacity or
under color of legal authority.136 Thus defendants are non-
state individuals and entities—in practice, foreign entities
and individuals, given that the ATA does not provide for
civil liability for domestic terrorism. The ATA clearly
disposed of the issue Judge Edwards raised in Tel-Oren as to
whether international law applies to private actors accused
of committing terrorism. The measure of the illegality of
“violent acts or acts dangerous to human life” under the
ATA is whether those acts would be illegal under U.S. law if
committed within the U.S.137
Still, there remained serious practical limits to successfully
asserting terrorism claims, including personal jurisdiction
under the ATA ‘is akin to a Russian matryoshka doll, with statutes
nested inside of statutes.’) (quoting Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.,
449 F.Supp.2d 992, 1032 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2008)).
136 18 U.S.C. § 2337 (2012). As noted below, this section is now
inapplicable to JASTA claims. See infra note 224.
137 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(A) (2012).
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and the practicalities of executing on any judgment. One of
the biggest questions was whether individuals or charities
could be liable for funding terrorist conduct abroad through
donations, or whether banks could be liable for facilitating
transfers of funds in aid of terrorist activities. The ATA as
approved in 1992 said nothing one way or the other about
liability for aiding and abetting terrorist activity.
Courts have reached differing conclusions on the question of
secondary liability, in light of the civil liability provisions of
the ATA and criminal penalties for providing “material
support” for terrorism.138 Currently the Second and Seventh
138 Congress did specifically address the aiding and abetting question in
the ATA in 1994 and 1996, but in the context of provisions for criminal
and civil penalties for the “material support” for terrorism. 18 U.S.C. §§
2339A, 2339B, 2339C (2012). See generally Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010). For useful background, see, e.g., Brent Tunis,
Material-Support-to-Terrorism Prosecutions: Fighting Terrorism by Eroding
Judicial Review, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 269 (2012). There is a complex
relationship between these criminal provisions and civil liability. One
might take the position, as does Sant, that they are entirely separate
matters, with the criminal provisions having no relation to civil liability.
See Sant, supra note 135, at 558-63. Even in this view, there remained a
distinct question whether the civil liability provisions of the ATA
encompass aiding and abetting liability. Moreover, while inferring a civil
cause of action from the ATA’s criminal provisions would be a bold step,
one might – as did the Seventh Circuit – look to the criminal provisions
on material support “not as independent sources of liability under
section 2333, but to amplify what Congress meant by ‘international
U.MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 24342
Circuits have answered in the negative, other lower courts
have found that the ATA does encompass secondary
liability.139 Even where secondary liability is rejected, banks
or charities might be primarily liable under the Seventh
Circuit’s interpretation, where support was given knowing
that it would be used for terrorist activities. The Second
Circuit, while rejecting secondary liability, permits banks or
other alleged providers of support to be held liable under
the ATA if the financial support in question was the
proximate cause of the injury.140 In some instances, the court
reasoned, donations to groups supporting terrorism could
terrorism.’” Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute and Holy Land
Foundation for Relief and Development, 291 F. 3d 1000, 1016 (7th Cir.
2002) (Boim I). See also Havlish v. Bin Laden (In re Terrorist Attacks on
September 11, 2001), No. 03 MDL 1570 (GBD), 2011 BL 442294 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 22, 2011), Conclusions of Law ¶ 17 (holding Iran liable for provision
of “material support” to al-Qaeda in 9/11 attacks) (citing 18 U.S.C. §
2339A(b)).
139 See Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 97-98 (2d Cir. 2012) (construing
ATA not to provide for secondary liability); Boim v. Holy Land
Foundation for Relief and Development, 549 F.3d 685, 689 (7th Cir. 2008)
(en banc) (same); Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1
(D.D.C. 2010) (construing ATA to provide for secondary liability). For a
useful account of the development of secondary liability by a strong
critic of it, see Sant, supra note 135.
140 Rothstein, 708 F.3d at 91.
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be an activity “dangerous to human life.”141 The unsettled
status of many questions relating to the liability of actors
others than the individuals or groups who carry out terrorist
attacks left a great deal of room for litigation.142
141 Boim, 549 F.3d at 690. The court analogized it to liability for criminal
recklessness in knowingly giving a child a loaded gun. Id. The court took
note of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
Pub. L. 103-322, title XII (Sept. 13, 1994). That statute makes it illegal to
provide material support within the U.S. to terrorists, where such
support is done “knowing or intending that . . . [it is] to be used in
preparation for, or in carrying out,” an act of international terrorism as
defined by the ATA.
142 See Saperstein and Sant, supra note 61 (as of 2012, there were more
than 100 reported decisions under the ATA, with many of them
involving banks and donors). For an illuminating analysis of the legal
issues posed in relations to banks alleged to have supported terrorism,
see Gurulé, supra note 60. For an argument that the ATA does not
provide for secondary liability, but should, see Alison Bitterly, Can Banks
Be Liable for Aiding and Abetting Terrorism? A Closer Look into the Split on
Secondary Liability Under the Antiterrorism Act, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3389,
3429 (2015). For a comprehensive proposal to amend the ATA to provide
for secondary liability, see Gurulé, supra note 60, at 219-23. Of course, as
discussed below, JASTA significantly changed the law by giving aiding
and abetting liability a statutory basis. See text accompanying infra notes
234-239.
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2. THE ANTI-TERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE
DEATH PENALTY ACT AND THE FLATOW
AMENDMENT
In 1996, Congress enacted two provisions dealing with
terrorism lawsuits against foreign states, though exactly
what Congress intended to accomplish was to become the
subject of litigation. These two changes came in separate
bills passed within months of each other.
First, Congress amended the FSIA to make two changes to
foreign sovereign immunity. Under a new section 1605(a)(7),
states that were on the list of state sponsors of terror would
not have immunity for claims by U.S. nationals based on
“torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, [or] hostage
taking.”143 The first suit brought under this provision was
against Cuba, for shooting down civilian aircraft over
international waters in 1996.144 Congress also provided in a
143 The amendment was part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 221, 110 Stat. 1214 (April 24,
1996). The AEDPA was, in part, a response to the 1993 World Trade
Center attack and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. See Schaack, supra
note 50, at 395. But it was also the vehicle for many other changes to
federal law, including limitations on post-conviction remedies and
challenges to the death penalty.
144 Alejandre v. The Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1249 (S.D. Fla.
1997). See generally Joseph W. Glannon & Jeffrey Atik, Politics and Personal
Jurisdiction: Suing State Sponsors of Terrorism Under the 1996 Amendments
To the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 87 GEO. L.J. 675, 675-80 (1999);
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new section 1610(a)(7) that a foreign state’s property, if used
for a commercial activity in the United States, would not be
immune from execution of a judgment covered by section
1605(a)(7), “regardless of whether the property is or was
involved in the act upon which the claim was based.”145 This
latter phrase removed the requirement of a nexus between
the property being executed upon and the claim.
Several months after amending the FSIA, Congress
approved what is commonly known as the Flatow
Amendment.146 The Flatow Amendment provides that an
“official, employee or agent of a foreign state” on the list of
state sponsors of terrorism, acting within the scope of
employment, would be liable to U.S. citizens for personal
injury or death, along with punitive damages. 147 Any
Stephen J. Schnably, Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 768
(1998).
145 Pub. L. 104-132, (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1610(b)(7)) (2012).
146 For whatever difference it might make in construing the Flatow
Amendment, it is not at all clear that it is an amendment to the FSIA. It is
codified as a note to section 1605 of the FSIA. See Flatow v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 308 F.3d 1065, 1067 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002). Similarly, the
TVPA, codified as a note to the ATS, is generally not regarded as an
amendment to the ATS. Apostolova, supra note 32, at 652.
147 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. 104-208
§ 589 (Sept. 30, 1996). See generally Joseph Keller, The Flatow Amendment
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immunities that a U.S. government official or agent might
enjoy would extend to the foreign agent as well.
Two things were notable about these changes. Congress left
important matters unclear. And what was made clear ranges
from the hard-to-defend to the indefensible.
and State-Sponsored Terrorism, 28 SEATTLEU.L. REV. 1029 (2005). The
Amendment was named in memory of Alisa Flatow, who was killed in a
terrorist attack in the Gaza Strip. The amendment, codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605 note (2012), provides in full:
(a) an official, employee, or agent of a foreign state designated as a
state sponsor of terrorism designated under section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 while acting within the scope of his or
her office, employment, or agency shall be liable to a United States
national or the national's legal representative for personal injury or
death caused by acts of that official, employee, or agent for which the
courts of the United States may maintain jurisdiction under section
1605(a)(7) of title 28, United States Code, for money damages which
may include economic damages, solatium, pain, and suffering, and
punitive damages if the acts were among those described in section
1605(a)(7).
(b) Provisions related to statute of limitations and limitations on
discovery that would apply to an action brought under 28 U.S.C.
1605(f) and (g) shall also apply to actions brought under this section.
No action shall be maintained under this action if an official,
employee, or agent of the United States, while acting within the
scope of his or her office, employment, or agency would not be liable
for such acts if carried out within the United States.
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The unclarities related to three matters: whether Congress
had provided for causes of action against foreign states;
whether it had modified sovereign immunity from
execution; and whether the changes to the law were
retroactive. With regard to the first matter, lifting sovereign
immunity from suit is not logically the same thing as
providing a cause of action against states. Nor is providing
for a cause of action against agents of states. In the absence of
a federal cause of action against foreign states, plaintiffs
would be forced to rely on state tort law, as had been the
case in Letelier, for example. Applying differing legal
standards to victims (and their relatives) of a terrorist attack
abroad, depending on the particular U.S. state in which the
victims or relatives were domiciled, could only lead to
inconsistent relief. It could also affect the availability of
punitive damages. Only if the FSIA were held to create a
cause of action against states would punitive damages be
available.148 A number of district courts decided that the
FSIA amendment did provide for a cause of action against
148 Lamberth, supra note 117, at 7.
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states.149 In 2004, the D.C. Circuit held otherwise, posing a
serious barrier to such lawsuits.150
It is worth noting that Congress’s lack of clarity did not
reflect a lack of interest in the subject. Spurred on by the
1996 legislation, a second effort by the Americans taken
hostage in 1979 to press claims against Iran commenced in
2000. 151 After they secured a default judgment, the Bush
Administration intervened and took the position that the
judgment was inconsistent with the Algiers Accords, which,
in resolving the hostage crisis, had precluded further
assertion in U.S. courts of claims arising out of it. The
Administration also asserted that Iran had immunity under
the FSIA, despite the 1996 amendments to it.152 In response,
149 E.g., Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1249 (S.D. Fla.
1997). The court ruled, however, that punitive damages were available
only against agents of states, not states themselves. Id.
150 Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024, 1032 (D.C.
Cir. 2004).
151 Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Roeder I), 195 F. Supp. 2d 140
(D.D.C. 2002), aff’d, 333 F.3d 228 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
152 Section 1605(a)(7)(A) provided that a state would not have immunity
for torture and other human rights violations only if it was on the list of
state sponsors of terrorism at the time of the conduct giving rise to the
claims. The list of state sponsors of terrorism was not created until
December 1979, and Iran was not added until 1984, after the hostage
crisis. See Roeder I, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 160. Section 1605(a)(7)(A) further
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in November 2001 Congress—through a provision added at
the last minute to an appropriations bill—amended then-
section 1607(a)(7)(A) (providing terrorism-related exceptions
to immunity) to refer to that specific case.153 In December
2001, after the court expressed uncertainty about the
meaning of this provision, Congress made a minor technical
change to the FSIA amendment it had approved in
November, including the change in a Defense
appropriations bill. 154 An accompanying statement in the
conference report referred to the Bush Administration’s
position and stated flatly that the American hostages “have a
claim against Iran under the Antiterrorism Act of 1996” and
that the amendment to section 1607(a)(7)(A) allowed the
default judgment to stand. 155 Ultimately the potential for
provided that if a state was added to the list after the claims arose, it
would have its immunity lifted if it was “so designated as a result of” the
conduct giving rise to the claim. The Bush administration informed the
court that Iran had not been placed on the list as a result of the taking of
hostages. Roeder I, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 151.
153 Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-77, § 626(c),
115 Stat. 748, 803 (2001). See Roeder I, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 152.
154 See Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 107-117, 115 Stat. 2230 (2002).
155 H.R. REP. NO. 107-350, at 422-423 (2001) (Conf. Rep.).
U.MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 24350
constitutional confrontation was avoided when the court
decided that it would not interpret the 1996 amendments to
the FSIA as abrogating the Algiers Accord without a very
clear statement of Congressional intent to do so.156
As for the second matter, the changes to immunity from
execution turned out to be full of hidden pitfalls. As noted
earlier, in 1996 Congress removed the nexus requirement for
execution on a foreign state’s property as to claims under the
new terrorism exception.157 As the Flatows discovered after
156 Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Roeder II), 333 F.3d 228, 237-38
(D.C. Cir. 2003). The court also held that the November 2001 provision
affected only jurisdiction, and did not purport to create a cause of action.
See id. at 238.
Congress acted again the next year with the Terrorism Risk Insurance
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 201, 116 Stat. 2322 (Nov. 26, 2002),
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1610 Note (2012), which allowed plaintiffs with
judgments secured under the terrorism exception to the FSIA to execute
against assets of the foreign state and its agents that had been frozen
under the President’s emergency powers. See Bank Markazi v. Peterson,
136 S. Ct. 1310, 1318 (2016). Ten years later, as it sought to ensure that
plaintiffs who had secured judgments against Iran on a different matter –
the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut – Congress followed
up with very specific legislation that occasioned a Supreme Court ruling
on Congress’s constitutional power to intervene in pending cases. See
text accompanying infra notes 263-271.
157 See text accompanying supra note 145.
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winning a default judgment against Iran in 1998,158 however,
Congress did not eliminate the general requirement in
section 1610(a) that only foreign state property “used for a
commercial activity in the United States” would be subject to
execution.159 Their efforts to execute on the former Iranian
embassy and consular properties in Washington, D.C.,
appeared to founder on the commercial activity limitation,
when the State Department filed a statement opposing their
efforts. Congress swiftly enacted a law general in its
expression, but seemingly tailored to the Flatows’ efforts:
Foreign diplomatic or consular property subject to an asset
freeze (as were Iran’s diplomatic and consular properties at
the time160) could be used to satisfy a claim brought under
the terrorism exception.161 Congress also added a provision
allowing the President to waive this new section “in the
158 Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998).
159 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (2012).
160 Blocking Iranian Government Property, Executive Order 12170, 44
Fed. Reg. 65729 (Nov. 14, 1979); Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of
the United States Relating to International Law, 93 AMER. J. INT’L L. 161, 184-
85 (1999) (citing U.S. government statement filed with court).
161 Treasury and General Governmental Appropriations Act, 1999, §
117(a), contained in Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat.
2681-491 (Oct. 21, 1998). This bill added present § 1610(a)(f)(1)(A).
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interest of national security.”162 President Clinton did so the
day he signed the bill, arguing that the new provision
“encroach[ed] on my authority under the Constitution” and
would endanger the conduct of foreign policy.163
Going after the assets of a state-owned bank might seem to
be another matter. Suppose U.S. nationals injured by an act
of terrorism abroad obtain a judgment against a foreign
state, and now seek to execute on the assets of such a bank.
Section 1610(a)(7) would seem to permit execution, without
any need to show that the bank had in any way been
involved in the act of terrorism that underlay the judgment.
What Congress did not do in 1996, however, was address the
continued relevance of the Supreme Court’s determination
in 1983 that the separate corporate form of state-owned
entities should be respected for liability purposes unless the
degree of control by the state was sufficient to pierce the
corporate veil.164 In other words, did then-section 1610(a)(7)
lift immunity from attachment from a state-owned bank
162 Treasury and General Governmental Appropriations Act, 1999, §
117(d), supra note 161, 112 Stat. 2681-492.
163 SeeMurphy, supra note 160, at 185 (quoting Statement on Signing the
Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
Act, 1999, 34 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2108, 2113 (Oct. 23, 1998)).
164 See First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba
(Bancec), 462 U.S. 611, 629-630 (1983).
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only if the state exercised day-to-day control over it? The
Ninth Circuit, with the concurrence of the Bush
Administration, answered this in the affirmative in a case in
which the Flatows sought to execute against a California
subsidiary of a state-owned Iranian bank.165 Whatever one
concludes about this issue, the very fact that it was an issue is
a sign of how incomplete Congress’s treatment was.
Finally, Congress was of course quite aware of recent
terrorist incidents and pending or possible lawsuits, so one
might have expected it to be clear about the retroactivity of
the changes. It was not. The amendments to the FSIA were
expressly made retroactive.166 But the Antiterrorism Act was
silent on the matter; the accompanying conference report
stated that it was intended to “apply to cases pending upon
enactment of this Act.” 167 The reason for the different
approaches was not clear.
To be sure, Congress does not always legislate clearly. But
one might expect the tolerance for ambiguity or omission
ought to be less where the legislation virtually invites U.S.
165 See Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 308 F.3d 1065, 1073 (9th Cir.
2002).
166 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.
L. 104-132, § 221(c), 110 Stat. at 1243 (1996).
167 H.R. REP. NO. 104-863, at 985 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). See Schnably, supra
note 144, at 771-72 & 772 n.42.
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citizens to bring suit. What heightened this tolerance,
perhaps, was the fact that failing to address these
ambiguities allowed Congress to approve legislation that
appeared to open up terrorists and states sponsoring them to
litigation, while leaving it to the courts to face the hard
choices - with the advice of an executive branch that on the
whole has tended to be more attuned to the foreign policy
strains generated by such litigation than has Congress.
As noted, Congress was clear as to certain matters, and what
it did make clear is highly questionable as a matter of policy.
Remedies for victims of foreign terrorism would continue to
be limited to U.S. nationals.168 That would be so even if non-
citizens were injured in the same attack. In one sense this is
understandable: we expect elected representatives to be
more attuned to the interests of members of the polity. And
foreign states could provide judicial remedies for their own
nationals. Civil litigation against terrorist groups and state
sponsors, however, was touted as part of the United States’
168 As then provided in § 1605(a)(7)(B)(ii) (as added to the FSIA by the
AEDPA), claims were limited to those brought by “nationals” as defined
under immigration law, which includes both citizens and any non-
citizens who “owe[] permanent allegiance to the United States.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(22) (2012). The ATA adopts the same definition. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2331(2) (2012). When the FSIA’s terrorism exception was later
consolidated into a new Section 1605A, the group of victims covered
expanded somewhat. See infra note 181.
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counterterrorism strategy, and from this perspective
exclusion of foreigners—especially foreign nationals with
U.S. residency 169 —makes no sense. In any event, the
consistent exclusion of foreign nationals from relief for
injuries and death caused by terrorism provides a striking
contrast to the stirring prospect in 1991 of vindication of
universal human rights through civil litigation.
Also open to reasonable difference of opinion would be an
approach that legislated vigorously to provide remedies for
injury to U.S. nationals caused by “terrorism” but not by
other serious human rights violations that do not amount to
terrorism. Perhaps the former is much worse, or poses more
of a threat to the U.S.
That is not, however, what the amendments did. To begin
with, only terrorist actions attributable to states on the State
Department list of state sponsors of terrorism would be
actionable. That list is notoriously politicized, its
composition heavily influenced by strategic questions of U.S.
foreign policy. 170 This fact effectively turned liability for
169 For an argument that statutes intended to aid victims of terrorism
should protect permanent non-citizen residents of the U.S., refugees and
others, as well as U.S. citizens, seeMostaghel, supra note 117, at 104-19.
170 See generallyMatthew J. Peed, Blacklisting as Foreign Policy: The Politics
and Law of Listing Terror States, 54 DUKE L.J. 1321 (2005). In debate over
the 1996 AEDPA, Senator Arlen Specter complained that the limitation to
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torture or extrajudicial killing into a weapon against
disfavored states, with the shield retained for others in U.S.
favor. This weaponization of human rights litigation was
made even clearer, when Congress gave President George
W. Bush the power to waive the application of this exception
in the case of Iraq, now an ally after the U.S. invasion.171
states on the terrorism list would “allow impermissible foreign policy
consideration[s] to affect the ability of Americans to seek redress for their
injuries caused by foreign governments.” He favored a broad lifting of
immunity for terrorist actions (as he had proposed in a bill he introduced
in 1993), or lifting immunity as to any foreign state that failed to provide
adequate remedies to U.S. nationals injured by terrorism. 142 CONG. REC.
S3417, 3473 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1996). Proponents of the limitation argued
that lifting immunity was a “powerful and significant tool that should be
used cautiously.” 142 CONG. REC. S3417, 3463-64 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1996)
(remarks of Senator Hank Brown).
171 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-181 § 1083(d), 122 Stat. 343-344. (2008). See Republic of Iraq v. Beaty,
556 U.S. 848 (2009). See also U.S. Supreme Court Finds President’s Waiver of
Terrorism Exception to Iraq’s Sovereign Immunity Bars Pending Claims, 103
AMER. J. INT’L L. 582 (2009). The first time Congress approved the 1996
amendments to the FSIA, President Bush vetoed the bill, citing concern
that large damage judgments would interfere with reconstruction there.
Congress approved the bill a second time with this waiver provision. See
Lamberth, supra note 117, at 8; John F. Murphy, Civil Litigation Against
Terrorists and the Sponsors of Terrorism: Problems and Prospects, 28 REV.
LITIG. 315, 336-37 (2008).
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The legal impact of the list was, for several years, made even
greater by the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the 1996
amendments to the FSIA. In 2008, that court held that a state
not on the list was immune not only to claims arising from
terrorism abroad (covered by section 1605(a)(7)) but also to
claims arising from damage caused by terrorist acts within
the United States (covered in section 1605(a)(5) by the non-
commercial tort exception to immunity). 172 The court
rejected that interpretation three years later, opening the
way for the non-commercial tort exception to immunity to
apply to claims for injury within the U.S.—for example,
claims that Saudi Arabia had sponsored or financed the 9/11
attacks.173
There was an even subtler problem that a less political list
would not address. Under the then-new section 1605(a)(7), if
a state was on the State Department terrorism list, it would
lose its immunity not for “terrorism” but for “personal
injury or death” caused by torture, extrajudicial killing,
aircraft sabotage, or hostage taking (or by certain support for
such acts). There was no requirement that the torture (for
example) be related to any terrorist activity at all. If the state
was not on the terrorism list, on the other hand, there would
172 In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F. 3d 71, 89 (2d Cir.
2008).
173 Doe v. Usama Bin Laden, 663 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2011).
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be no exception to immunity for the same acts of torture. If
Congress wanted to make terrorism rather than “lesser”
human rights violations by states actionable in federal court,
it could have done that. But what it did instead was to
provide, in effect, that torture by a state on the State
Department terrorism list is worse than torture by other
states.174
Congress’s legislative efforts in 1996, then, marked a major
step in the direction of weaponizing one form of human
rights litigation. States that were placed on a highly political
list of state sponsors of terrorism were vulnerable to suit for
human rights violations including but by no means limited
to terrorism. States not on that list would be subject to suit
for human rights violations only if the injury occurred
within the U.S.
3. THE 2008 AMENDMENT TO THE FSIA
In 2008 Congress returned to the subject once again, now
amending the FSIA. 175 This provision was embodied in
174 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (2012) (stating the new exception to immunity
from execution matched the new exception to liability, perpetuating the
same distinction).
175 In the interim, Congress had again modified the FSIA’s provisions on
immunity from execution in 1998. See Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 199, Pub. L. No. 105-277
§ 117, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998).
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section 1083 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2008.176 This Act created a new section 1605A of
the FSIA, consolidating what had been sections 1605(a)(7)
and 1605(a)(10). As part of this change, Congress resolved
the issue that it had left unclear in 1996,177 expressly creating
a cause of action against foreign states for terrorism. 178
Congress also made clear that punitive damages could be
awarded in such cases. And it expanded the basis for
execution against the assets owned by a foreign state found
liable. New section 1610(g) provides that the property of a
foreign state or an agency thereof found liable under section
1605A is subject to execution, even if held by a juridically
separate entity.179 It thus resolved the questions courts had
176 Pub. L. 110-181, 122 Stat. 3, § 1083.
177 See text accompanying supra notes 148-149.
178 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c) (2012). That section created a private right of
action by U.S. nationals and others against a foreign state sponsor of
terrorism or officials or agents of the foreign state for personal injury or
death in situations where the FSIA denied immunity under § 1605A(a)(1)
(the new codification, with some modification) of the terrorism exception
created in 1996.
179 See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) (2012):
Property in Certain Actions.—
(1) In general.—Subject to paragraph (3), the property of a
foreign state against which a judgment is entered under section
1605A, and the property of an agency or instrumentality of such
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raised earlier as to whether the separate legal form of state-
owned entities should be disregarded. 180 As before, the
statute protected primarily U.S. nationals, though the class
of potential plaintiffs may have been expanded somewhat.181
Congress did more than legislate generally. It also included
provisions that seemed designed to allow revival of the
Iranian hostage victims’ lawsuit, and indeed, after section
a state, including property that is a separate juridical entity or is
an interest held directly or indirectly in a separate juridical
entity, is subject to attachment in aid of execution, and execution,
upon that judgment as provided in this section, regardless of—
(A) the level of economic control over the property by the
government of the foreign state;
(B) whether the profits of the property go to that
government;
(C) the degree to which officials of that government
manage the property or otherwise control its daily affairs;
(D) whether that government is the sole beneficiary in
interest of the property; or
(E) whether establishing the property as a separate entity
would entitle the foreign state to benefits in United States
courts while avoiding its obligations.
180 See text accompanying supra notes 164-165.
181 In contrast to the old § 1605(a)(7), see supra note 168, the denial of
immunity is not limited to claims brought by U.S. nationals, but also
includes members of the armed forces, U.S. employees or employees of
U.S. government contractors acting within the scope of employment, and
the legal representative of any of the preceding. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c).
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1605A was enacted, plaintiffs filed a new lawsuit. As
indicated earlier, a fundamental barrier to such a lawsuit
was that Iran had not been a designated on sponsor of
terrorism when the hostage taking occurred; nor was the
hostage taking the official reason for its inclusion when Iran
was put on the list in 1984. Thus Iran would still enjoy
immunity unless there was some other basis for lifting it.
The new section 1605A provided that a state would not have
immunity to a claim brought under section 1605A if the state
was on the terrorism when “the related action under
1605(a)(7) (as in effect before the enactment of [1605A]) . . .
was filed.” Iran was in fact on the State Department
terrorism list when a prior related action had been filed in
2000. But did this provision apply only to cases pending
under the older section 1605(a)(7) at the time section 1605A
was enacted? At the time of section 1605A’s enactment, the
earlier Iranian hostage case was no longer pending, having
been dismissed. Nothing in section 1605A clarified this
question, but a heading within Section 1083 of the
appropriations act did refer to “application to pending
cases.” 182 The D.C. Circuit determined that it was not
sufficiently clear that the 2008 amendment to the FSIA was
intended to allow revival of prior cases, as opposed to
refiling of cases that were pending in 2008. Even more
striking, the court noted that Congress had again failed to
182 Pub. L. 110-181, 122 Stat. 3, § 1083(c).
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make clear that it intended to abrogate the Algiers
Accords.183
B. THE 9/11 LITIGATION AND THE JUSTICE AGAINST
SPONSORS OF TERRORISMACT
The 2008 amendment to the FSIA by no means resolved all
the general issues related to claims for compensation. Efforts
to hold Saudi Arabia and some non-state entities such as
charities liable for allegedly sponsoring or financing the
9/11 attacks well illustrate a number of the unresolved
issues and Congress’s detailed attention (or perhaps
inattention) to them.184
Lawsuits filed in 2003 by survivors of the 9/11 attacks,
relatives of those killed, and insurers who paid claims
arising from the attacks were consolidated into a single
183 Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 646 F.3d 56 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 2680 (2012). Ultimately, the plaintiffs received
compensation through Congressional legislation enacted in 2015. The
awards were funded from a $9 billion penalty against a French bank for
violating sanctions against Iran, Sudan, and Cuba. See David M.
Herszenhorn, Americans Held Hostage in Iran Win Compensation 36 Years
Later, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2015.
184 See Steve Vladeck, The 9/11 Civil Litigation and the Justice Against
Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA), JUST SECURITY, April 18, 2016,
https://www.justsecurity.org/30633/911-civil-litigation-justice-
sponsors-terrorism-act-jasta/ (providing an excellent account of the
litigation in relation to JASTA, on which the account here draws).
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proceeding in the Southern District of New York and
captioned In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001.
Plaintiffs were survivors, family members, and insurance
companies. Defendants were Saudi Arabia, various Saudi
agencies and officials, al Qaeda and related groups, and
banks and charities alleged to have supported those
groups.185 In 2005, the district court ruled that Saudi Arabia,
185 In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 779-
80 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 392 F.
Supp. 2d 539, 546-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
The 9/11 claims are not limited to Saudi Arabia. Plaintiffs also
brought an action against Iran for aiding and abetting al-Qaeda in the
9/11 attacks. The claims were brought under the terrorism exception to
the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2012). (Iran is on the State Department’s
state sponsors of terrorism list. See United States Department of State,
State Sponsors of Terrorism,
https://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm; Kenneth Katzman, Iran
Sanctions 3, 5 (Cong. Res. Serv. Rep. No. RS20871, Jan. 31, 2017). In 2011,
the court found Iran liable. Havlish v. Bin Laden (In re Terrorist Attacks
on September 11, 2001), No. 03 MDL 1570 (GBD), 2011 BL 442294
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2011), Conclusions of Law ¶¶ 14-35. The following
year it made a default award to plaintiffs of $1,362,277,884 in
compensatory damages and $4,686,235,921 in punitive damages
(apparently the second default judgment so rendered). In re Terrorist
Attacks on September 11, 2001 (Havlish v. bin Laden, 2012 WL 4711407
(No. 03 Civ. 9848 (GBD) (FM), No. 03 MDL 1570 (GBD) (FM)); Letter
from Lee Wolosky & Michael J. Gottlieb to Prime Minister Xavier Bettel,
March 2, 2017, at 2,
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3480413-Wolosky-Letter-
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along with certain Saudi princes and agencies, had sovereign
immunity.186 It found that none of the FSIA exceptions were
available to those with sovereign immunity. In particular, it
rejected the non-commercial tort exception to the FSIA
(section 1605(a)(5)). That section provides an exception to
sovereign immunity in a case of injury occurring within the
U.S., caused by tortious acts of foreign officials acting within
the scope of their employment. The court agreed that the
exception to section 1605(a)—for claims based on the
exercise of discretionary functions—applied here. 187 Not
surprisingly, the court rejected the state sponsors of
terrorism exception, because Saudi Arabia is not on the
to-PM-Bettel-Iran-default-judgment.html. There remains the question of
execution, but plaintiffs have sought to attach $1.6 billion of Iranian
funds held by Clearstream, a international clearinghouse in
Luxembourg. See Charlie Savage, Iran Nuclear Deal Could Be Gateway for
Terrorism Legal Claims, N.Y. TIMES, March 6, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/us/politics/terrorism-foreign-
governments-lawsuits-iran-nuclear-deal.html?_r=1.
186 Terrorist Attacks, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 783-92; Terrorist Attacks, 392 F.
Supp. 2d at 551-53.
187 349 F. Supp. 2d at 801-04; 392 F. Supp. 2d at 555-56. See also supra note
54. The court also rejected the commercial activities exception under 28
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012), see 349 F. Supp. 2d at 793-794; 392 F. Supp. 2d
at 553-54; and found insufficient allegations to support causation as to
the Kingdom and certain princes, 392 F. Supp. 2d at 795-801.
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list. 188 The court also rejected defendants’ argument that
Saudi Arabia’s absence from that list precluded liability not
only under the state sponsors of terrorism exception, but
also under section 1605(a)(5) (the non-commercial tort
exception).189
In 2008 the Second Circuit upheld the district court’s
dismissal of claims, but disagreed with the district court on
this last issue. As noted earlier, it ruled that the non-
inclusion of Saudi Arabia on the state sponsors of State
Department terrorism list precluded liability under the non-
commercial tort exception. 190 The Supreme Court later
denied certiorari. 191 In 2011, however, the Second Circuit,
ruling in a different case, rejected the 2008 ruling that the
availability of the non-commercial tort exception is
dependent on inclusion on the State Department terrorism
list.192 The 9/11 plaintiffs then asked the district court to
188 349 F. Supp. 2d at 793-94.
189 See id. at 795-96.
190 In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71 (2d Cir.
2008). See text accompanying supra note 172172.
191 Fed. Ins. Co. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 557 U.S. 935 (2009).
192 Doe v. Bin Laden, 663 F.3d 64, 68-71 (2d Cir. 2011). To rule otherwise,
the court noted, would have been to hold put an end to the liability
successfully asserted in cases like Letelier and Liu (in which a foreign
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reopen their case; in 2013, the Second Circuit reversed the
district court’s denial of that motion, and the case was
reopened.193
In September 2015, the district court dismissed the complaint
on a different ground: The non-commercial tort exception to
sovereign immunity did not apply, the court held, because
of the “entire tort” rule. 194 The claims for liability are
complex, but center on assertions that the Saudi government
or other defendants (including Saudi princes and various
state was sued for assassinating a dissident on U.S. soil), see text
accompanying supra notes 62-66, unless the state was on the terrorism
list. See id. at 69.
193 In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 741 F.3d 353, 355-59 (2d
Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014). The Second Circuit did not
rule on the discretionary function exception to the non-commercial tort
exception to foreign sovereign immunity. Id. at 359; In re Terrorist
Attacks, 714 F.3d 659, 117 n.11 (2d Cir. 2013).
194 In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 134 F. Supp. 3d 774
(S.D.N.Y. 2015). In so ruling, the court followed an earlier ruling of the
Second Circuit regarding some of the charity defendants, in which it
affirmed the applicability of the “entire tort” rule, which Argentine
Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 441 (1989), is
generally seen as having established. See In re Terrorist Attacks of
September 11, 2001, 714 F.3d 109, 116 (2d Cir. 2013). SeeWalter W.
Heiser, Civil Litigation as a Means of Compensating Victims of International
Terrorism, 3 SANDIEGO INT’L L.J. 1, 12-13 (2002).
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Saudi organizations including banks and charities)
supported and funded terrorism. While the injuries from
9/11 attacks obviously occurred within the United States,
the alleged assistance to the 9/11 hijackers was abroad.195
The plaintiffs filed an appeal in October 2015, and Congress
took an interest.
Within months, members of Congress began to raise issues
related to a classified report addressing the question of
Saudi Arabia involvement in the 9/11 attacks. This report
had been issued in 2002 by a Joint Committee of the House
195 134 F. Supp. 3d at 781, 782-87. The court took note of the earlier ruling
finding that the discretionary function exception applied, see id. at 781-
82, but here found that the entire tort rule was not satisfied as to each of
the defendants. The court also rejected the argument that “the 9/11
attacks were themselves an entire tort committed in the United States
caused by Defendants’ conduct abroad,” id. at 787 n.13, citing the Second
Circuit’s ruling in In re Terrorist Attacks, 714 F.3d at 117 n.10.
As Steve Vladeck has noted, the claims raise other issues as well. These
include whether there is any liability under the ATA for aiding and
abetting or something like it, see text accompanying supra note 141, and,
if it is recognized, what if anything must be shown regarding intent and
causation. See Gurulé, supra note 60; see also Vladeck, supra note 184;
Steve Vladeck, The Senate Killed JASTA, Then Passed It, JUST SECURITY,
(May 18, 2016) [hereinafter, “Vladeck, The Senate Killed JASTA”],
https://www.justsecurity.org/31156/senate-killed-jasta-passed-it/.
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and Senate. 196 At that time, a 28-page section had been
redacted as classified. Soon after its issuance there had been
news reports suggesting that the redacted pages detailed
links between the hijackers and Saudi individuals, possibly
including officials or individuals with close ties to officials.
After largely fading from public view for nearly a decade,
the issue was revived by comments by former Senator Bob
Graham in 2011 calling for their release; Graham had been a
co-chair of the Joint Committee. Members of Congress began
to press the Obama administration to declassify and release
the 28 pages; bills were introduced to that effect.
In February 2016 the 28 pages briefly became an issue in the
presidential primaries. The Obama administration initiated a
declassification review, and, responding to the pressure
created by the prospect of legislative action on a bill to
modify the ATA and FSIA to permit the Saudi claims to go
forward,197 declassified most of the information in them. On
July 15, 2016, the House Intelligence Committee released the
28 pages. How useful they may prove to plaintiffs is subject
196 Joint Inquiry into the Intelligence Community Activities Before and
After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, S. Rep. No. 107-351, H.
Rep. No. 107-792.
197 See Karen DeYoung, Saudi Officials Tout the Country’s Efforts to Crack
Down on Terror Financing, WASH. POST., June 8, 2016 (noting efforts to
pass JASTA “led to renewed pressure to release the 28 pages”).
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to debate, but they were widely regarded as containing no
dramatic revelation.198
On September 16, 2015, Senator Charles Schumer and
Representative Peter King, both of New York, introduced
the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA) in
Congress, along with a number of co-sponsors from both
parties. 199 Its preamble declared that “knowingly or
recklessly contribut[ing] material support or resources,
directly or indirectly, to persons or organizations that pose a
significant risk of committing acts of terrorism” threatens
national security. 200 Although drafted in general terms,
198 Mark Mazzetti, In 9/11 Document, View of a Saudi Effort to Thwart U.S.
Action on Al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2016; Karen DeYoung, Congress
Releases Long-Classified ‘28 pages’ on Alleged Saudi Ties to 9/11, WASH.
POST., July 15, 2016; Chris Mondics,Why a Philly Firm Wants the Saudis
Sued, Philly.com, (July 23, 2016), http://articles.philly.com/2016-07-
23/business/74648474_1_bayoumi-congressional-joint-inquiry-saudi-
arabia.
199 Cong. Rec., Vol. 161, No. 133, Sept. 16, 2015 (114th Cong., 1st Sess.
daily ed.), at 56701, https://www.congress.gov/congressional-
record/2015/09/16/senate-section/article/S6700-1. An earlier version
of the bill was introduced in 2009. Juliet Eilperin and Karoun Demirian,
Congress Thwarts Obama on Bill Allowing 9/11 Lawsuits Against Saudi
Arabia, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2016.
200 Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, S. 2040, 114th Cong.
§ 2(a)(6) (2016).
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JASTA was formulated with the claims against Saudi Arabia
very much in mind. 201 The Saudi government was not
unaware of this, and threatened economic retaliation against
the U.S. if JASTA were enacted.202
The then-proposed JASTA gained publicity when the CBS
news show 60 Minutes aired a segment in April 2016 on the
case and the 28 pages issue shortly before the President
visited Saudi Arabia. Major presidential candidates in both
parties endorsed the bill before the New York primary on
April 19, 2016. 203 Beyond providing a vehicle for elected
officials to express sympathy for victims of 9/11, support for
JASTA became a way to express opposition to U.S. support
for Saudi Arabia’s military intervention in Yemen.204
201 SeeWilliam Dodge, JASTA and Reciprocity, JUST SECURITY, (June 9,
2016); Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Don’t Let Americans Sue Saudi
Arabia, N.Y. TIMES, April 22, 2016.
202 Mark Mazzetti, Saudi Arabia Warns of Economic Fallout If Congress
Passes 9/11 Bill, N.Y. TIMES, April 16, 2016.
203 Michael D. Goldhaber, The Global Lawyer: Terror Plaintiffs Still Have
Friends in Washington, AM. LAW. DAILY, May 17, 2016,
http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2011/09/the-global-
lawyer-the-kingdom-and-the-911-plaintiffs.html.
204 Bruce Reidel,What JASTA Will Mean for U.S. Saudi Relations,
BROOKINGS, MARKAZ BLOG, Oct. 3, 2016 (noting that Saudi Arabia “in
increasingly unpopular in America,” in light of 9/11 and other factors,
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The process by which JASTA was adopted was remarkable.
The text of the bill was modified as it advanced through the
Senate, and underwent major changes shortly before its
passage by the Senate in May 2016.205 In early September
2016, the House approved the bill. Its prospects in the House
had previously not appeared great, but it was brought to the
floor not long after a group of 9/11 family members met
with House Speaker Paul Ryan in anticipation of the
fifteenth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks.206 It was debated in
neither house. Support came from both parties, and it was
passed overwhelmingly, with more than enough votes to
override a veto.
As expected, President Obama vetoed the bill, arguing that it
would provide no real protection against terrorist attacks,
and would weaken the international law doctrine of
including war in Yemen),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/10/03/what-jasta-
will-mean-for-u-s-saudi-relations/.
205 An Act to Deter Terrorism, Provide Justice for Victims, and for Other
Purposes, S. 2040, 114th Cong., 2d Sess., Pub. L. No. 114-222 (Sept. 28,
2016) [hereinafter “JASTA”].
206 Jennifer Steinhauer, House Passes Bill Allowing 9/11 Lawsuits Against
Saudi Arabia; White House Hints at Veto, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2016; Rachael
Bade and John Bresnahan, Suing the Saudis: House GOP Pressed to Pass
9/11 Bill, POLITICO, Sept. 7, 2016.
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sovereign immunity by encouraging other countries to adopt
exceptions, thereby putting U.S. officials and service
members at risk of suit, and complicating the president’s
conduct of foreign policy.207 The administration mounted a
lobbying effort seeking to persuade members of Congress
who had voted for the bill to sustain the veto.208 As Congress
considered the veto, the Senate voted on a resolution calling
for restrictions on arms sales to Saudi Arabia in light of its
207 Karoun Demirian and Juliet Eilperin, Congress Overrides Obama’s Veto
of 9/11 Bill, WASH. POST, PowerPost, Sept. 28, 2016 (“The Senate vote was
97 to 1 and the House tally was 348 to 77.”). See also Quinta Jurecic, Letter
from Rep. Adam Smith in Opposition JASTA, LAWFARE (Sep. 27, 2016, 4:51
PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/letter-rep-adam-smith-opposition-
jasta (reproducing letter from Rep. Adam Smith, Ranking Member,
House Armed Services Committee, to Democratic Colleagues, Sept. 25,
2016).
208 Karoun Demirjian and Juliet Eilperin,White House Accuses Congress of
“Buyer’s Remorse” on 9/11 Bill, WASH. POST, PowerPost, Sept. 29, 2016,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/09/29
/republican-leaders-say-911-measure-may-need-to-be-revisited-after-
elections/ (“In the days leading up to the override vote, the White
House, national security officials, the European Union’s delegation to the
United States and business leaders urged lawmakers to sustain the veto.
They warned the law will damage relations with Saudi Arabia and
encourage other countries to pass laws that would allow them to target
U.S. officials.”).
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military operations in Yemen targeting civilians. 209 On
September 28, Congress overrode the veto
overwhelmingly—the first time in the Obama presidency
that that had happened.210
President Obama accused members of Congress of lacking
familiarity with the provisions and effective consequences of
JASTA, attributing its passage to a reaction to “the scars and
trauma of 9/11.”211 What was more unusual was the reaction
of Congressional leaders. Noting the hastiness of the bill’s
passage, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
209 Demirian and Eilperin, supra note 207. See also Eilperin and Demirian,
supra note 199. The bill was tabled, but as a Human Rights Watch official
noted, “[T]he tide is turning” against Saudi Arabia. Id.
210 Eilperin and Demirian, supra note 207.
211 Demirian and Eilperin, supra note 207. See also Demirian and Eilperin,
supra note 208 (“Everybody was aware of who the potential beneficiaries
were, but nobody had really focused on the potential downsides in terms
of our international relationships”) (quoting Senate Majority Leader
Mitch McConnell, a supporter of the bill); Ted Barrett and Deirdre
Walsh, Congress Suddenly Has Buyer’s Remorse for Overriding Obama’s
Veto, CNN POLITICS, Sept. 29, 2016,
http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/29/politics/obama-911-veto-
congressional-concerns/ (quoting House Speaker Paul Ryan as having
concerns about the bill’s “unintended consequences,” but “you want to
make sure that the 9/11 victims and their families get their day in
court”).
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Committee said he “wish[ed] we had all focused on this a
little bit more, earlier.”212 Senator Lindsey Graham expressed
a desire to check whether Congress had opened a Pandora’s
box; he and twenty-seven other Senators sent a letter to
JASTA’s Senate sponsors calling on them to work “in a
constructive manner to appropriately mitigate . . . [JASTA’s]
unintended consequences.” 213 Senator Orrin Hatch said, “I
don't think we had enough time to consider all of the
ramifications,” adding that he was “worried about getting
into a tremendous legal morass that could really cost this
country.”214 House Speaker Ryan expressed the hope that a
modified bill could be approved to address the concerns
raised.215 Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell said, “I
just think it was a ball dropped,” and (as did some other
Senate members) proceeded to place the blame on President
Obama.216
It remains to be seen whether Congress will act on its
buyer’s remorse. In October 2016 U.S. Secretary of State John
212 Eilperin and Demirian, supra note 199.
213 Jordain Carney, Senators Already Eyeing Changes to 9/11 Bill After Veto
Override, THEHILL.COM, Sept. 28, 2016.
214 Carney, supra note 213.
215 Barrett and Walsh, supra note 211.
216 Id.
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Kerry and Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir had talks
about potential proposals to “fix” the problems associated
with JASTA.217 The Trump Administration’s position is not
clear. As a candidate, President Trump strongly criticized
President Obama’s veto of JASTA.218 The Saudi government
appears to be pressing the Trump administration to
reconsider the bill.219 In November 2016, Senators McCain
and Graham introduced a bill to amend JASTA to limit
liability to cases where “the foreign state knowingly engaged
in the financing or sponsorship of terrorism, whether
directly or indirectly.”220 In the meantime, the case proceeds.
217 Megan R. Wilson, Saudi Arabia Now Employing 14 Lobby Firms as It
Fights 9/11 Law, THEHILL, (Nov. 2, 2016), http://thehill.com/business-a-
lobbying/business-a-lobbying/304019-saudi-arabia-continues-
expansion-of-k-street-force. The month before, the Foreign Minister
spoke with the Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Id.
218 Mark Habeeb, Trump’s Election May Have Killed Prospects for Amending
JASTA, THEARABWEEKLY, (Nov. 27, 2016_,
http://www.thearabweekly.com/Opinion/7174/Trump%E2%80%99s-
election-may-have-killed-prospects-for-amending-JASTA.
219 Hoda al-Saleh, Did a CIA Medal to the Saudi Crown Prince Close the
JASTA File?, ALARABIYA (ENGLISH), (Feb. 15, 2017),
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/gulf/2017/02/15/How-a-CIA-
medal-to-Saudi-crown-prince-ended-the-JASTA-issue.html (quoting
Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir) (“The US estimates the negative
repercussions of implementing JASTA and it may reconsider it”).
220 Cong. Rec. S6612 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 2016) (statement of Sen. Graham).
The quotation is from Sen. Graham’s statement, not the proposed bill.
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On February 7, 2017, the Second Circuit granted a joint
motion to vacate the district court’s September 2015 opinion
and remand the case for further consideration in light of
JASTA.221
JASTA makes a number of changes to the law, including to
cases pending as of its effective date.222 It allows claims for
personal injury or property damage occurring in the U.S. if it
was caused either by “an act of international terrorism in the
United States,” or by a tortious act or acts (not, “act or
omission”) of the foreign state or its agents, “regardless of
where the tortious act or acts of the foreign state
occurred.” 223 This change is accomplished by denying
immunity to such claims through a new section 1605B of the
221 In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, No. 15-3426(L) (2d Cir.
Feb. 7, 2017).
222 JASTA, § 3(a), supra note 205, § 7.
223 JASTA, § 3(a), supra note 205 (JASTA also bars claims based purely on
“mere negligence.”). SeeWilliam Dodge, Does JASTA Violate International
Law? JUST SECURITY, (Sept. 30, 2016),
https://www.justsecurity.org/33325/jasta-violate-international-law-2/.
It should be noted that JASTA refers to no immunity for “damages
against a foreign state” for personal injury or property damage in the
U.S. caused by “(1) an act of international terrorism in the United States;
and (2) a tortious act of acts of the foreign state . . .” The “and” here
apparently refers to two instances in which immunity may be denied, as
opposed to two elements that must be satisfied in each case.
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FSIA, and authorizing such claims under the ATA. 224
Nothing in this provision requires that the foreign state be
on the State Department terrorism list. Plaintiffs must be
U.S. nationals.225
As with many of Congress’s forays in the area, the drafting
is not entirely clear. Despite some drafting unclarity, it
appears that “international terrorism” and “tortious acts”
224 JASTA §3(a), supra note 205, (allows claims against foreign states
under 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a)) (2012). That section allows U.S. nationals to
bring claims for personal injury or property damage by reason of an act
of international terrorism. Prior to JASTA, the ATA did not provide for
suits under § 2333 against foreign states, see 18 U.S.C. § 2337(2) (2012),
but JASTA modifies that with respect to any claim as to which JASTA
would remove immunity. In turn, a new § 1605B provides an exception
to foreign sovereign immunity for claims arising out an act of
international terrorism in the U.S., and for tortious acts or omissions of
foreign states or their agents, “regardless where the tortious act or acts of
the foreign state occurred.” Id.
225 JASTA §3(a), supra note 205, (codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1605B(c) (2016)).
Thus only a U.S. national could bring a JASTA claim against a foreign
state for an act of international terrorism occurring in the U.S. Yet a
slightly broader category of plaintiffs (U.S. nationals, armed forces
members, government employees and government contractors’
employees, and their legal representatives) could bring an action for an
act of international terrorism occurring outside the U.S. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605A(c) (2012); see supra note 181.
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are alternative bases for liability.”226 The reference to an act
of “international terrorism in the United States” is somewhat
infelicitous. JASTA adopts the ATA’s definition of
international terrorism.227 The ATA defines it as terrorism
“occur[ring] primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States” or as terrorism “transcend[ing] national
boundaries.”228 The idea of an act of international terrorism
that occurs in the U.S. but primarily outside U.S. territorial
jurisdiction is hard to fathom. One explanation may be that
Congress simply assumed that the 9/11 attacks were instead
acts of terrorism “transcend[ing] national boundaries.” 229
226 JASTA refers to no immunity for “damages against a foreign state” for
personal injury or property damage in the U.S. caused by “(1) an act of
international terrorism in the United States; and (2) a tortious act of acts
of the foreign state . . .” The “and” here apparently refers to two
instances in which immunity may be denied, as opposed to two elements
that must be satisfied in each case.
227 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(C) (2012).
228 JASTA, supra note 205, § 3(a), (codified as 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605B(a)(1)
(2016)).
229 See 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1(C) (2012) (referring to acts that “transcend
national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are
accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce,
or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum”). There
is a separate criminal provision for acts of terrorism transcending
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Even then it may be odd to refer to an act that transcends
national boundaries as taking place “in the United States.”
The provision might refer to the fact that much of the
planning took place outside the U.S., while the hijacking,
death and destruction occurred within it. In any event, to the
extent that the claims relate to the tort of financing and
supporting terrorism, JASTA expressly renders the “entire
tort” rule in applicable.230
There will be other legal issues to resolve as well. In contrast
to the non-commercial tort provision of the FSIA, JASTA
says nothing about an exception for discretionary
functions. 231 If the court interprets this silence as
national boundaries, added in 1996 by the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 702, 110 Stat. 1216,
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2332b (2012).
230 See text accompanying supra note 223.
231 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A) (201) (qualifying the non-commercial tort
exception to sovereign immunity with the proviso that the exception to
immunity does not apply to “any claim based upon” the exercise or
failure to exercise a “discretionary function”); JASTA, §3(a), supra note
205, codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1605B(b) (2016). In proposing in November
2016 to amend JASTA to limit liability to cases where a state
“knowingly” aids and abets terrorism, Senator Lindsey Graham
plaintively noted that “[s]omebody took the discretionary function
language out of the original [JASTA] bill. I guess a lot of them missed it.”
Cong. Rec. S6613 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 2016).
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Congressional rejection of the discretionary function
exception for JASTA claims, that would be significant, since
the earlier district court decision on the non-commercial tort
exception had found the discretionary function exception to
it applicable.232 The plaintiffs argue that JASTA has modified
the law regarding scope of agency and causation, which
have been difficult issues for plaintiffs in terrorism litigation
in the past. The defendants may argue that JASTA is
unconstitutional.233
232 See text accompanying supra notes 185-189; JASTA, §3(a), supra note
190 (JASTA does put a limitation on the exception to immunity, just as
does section 1605(a)(5). But whereas the limitations on the section
1605(a)(5) exception relate to discretionary functions, § 1605(a)(5)(A) and
certain specific torts, § 1605(a)(5)(B), the limitation in JASTA lifting of
immunity relates to claims for “mere negligence.”); JASTA, §3(a), supra
note 205, codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1605B(d) (2016) (“A foreign state shall
not be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States under
subsection (b) on the basis of an omission or a tortious act or acts that
constitute mere negligence.”). The contrast might strengthen the
argument that Congress meant for no discretionary function exception to
apply to JASTA claims.
233 See Joint Motion to Vacate and Remand in Light of Changes in Law, In
re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, No. 15-3426-cv, at 10 & 12. n3
(filed Oct. 21, 2016).
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Despite these uncertainties, in many respects JASTA could
cover the 9/11 attacks very well,234 to the extent that the
claim was that Saudi Arabia is primarily responsible for the
attacks, though that may prove difficult to prove or even
allege with sufficient specificity. As for assertions that high
Saudi officials or other agents committed a “tort or tortious
acts”235 in financing or supporting terrorism, the removal of
the entire tort rule may provide an opening; it should be
noted, though, that in dismissing the claims, the district
court emphasized how general or even speculative many of
234 After JASTA went into effect, at least one other lawsuit was filed
against Saudi Arabia; others are likely. See Greg Clary, 9/11 Widow Files
Lawsuit Against Saudi Arabia, CNN POLITICS, (Oct. 1, 2016),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/01/politics/saudi-arabia-9-11-lawsuit/.
Whether there is any state against which a plausible case for causing
damage by terrorism in the U.S. could be made is open to debate. A
complaint filed in February 2017 against Israeli officials characterizes
them as supporting international terrorism. Peled v. Netanyahu, No.
1:17-cv-00220 (D.D.C. Feb. 1, 2017), http://courthousenews.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/02/netanyahu.pdf. See Joshua Claybourn, How
Congress Made It Easier to Sue Israel, THEHILL.COM, (Feb. 6, 2017),
http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international-affairs/318097-
how-congress-made-it-easier-to-sue-israel. The complaint asserts claims
under the ATA, the ATS, JASTA, and a number of other statutes.
235 JASTA, Pub. L. No. 114-222, supra note 205, § 3(a) (codified as 28
U.S.C. § 1605B(b)(2) (2016).
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the allegations were.236 What may not work is any attempt to
predicate liability of Saudi Arabia or its officials or agents on
an aiding and abetting or conspiracy theory under Section 4
of JASTA. That section provides that a “person” may be
liable if they aid and abet “an act of international terrorism”
that was undertaken by an organization designated on the
foreign terrorist organization list. 237 “Person,” in turn, is
defined to “include corporations, companies, associations,
firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as
well as individuals”—but not, most likely, states.238 Liability
under this section of JASTA may be limited to claims against
236 E.g., In re Terrorist Attacks, 134 F. Supp. 3d at 787 (plaintiffs intend to
renew their bid for additional discovery on remand); See Joint Motion,
supra note 233, at 12-13.
237 JASTA, supra note 205, § 4(a) (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2))
(2016).
238 JASTA, supra note 205, § 4(a) (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(1))
(2016). The definition is accomplished by referring to the general
definition of person in 1 U.S.C. § 1. That definition makes no reference to
states or state agencies. It does, however, say that the term “includes” the
various entities listed. Courts would likely want a stronger basis than
that for holding a foreign state subject to suit. Note, also, that the aiding
and abetting liability relates only to an act of international terrorism
(presumably in the United States, although the new § 2333(d)(2) does not
so specify). A person who aided and abetted the tortious acts of a foreign
state would not be covered, since the sole reference in § 2333(d)(2) is to
international terrorism.
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non-state “persons” who knowingly aid and abet or conspire
with persons who commit an act of international terrorism if
that act was planned by a designated foreign terrorist
organization.239
239 JASTA, supra note 205, § 4(a). Steve Vladeck has made this point very
well. Vladeck, The Senate Killed JASTA, supra note 195. As he points out,
the new aiding and abetting liability is available only against “persons”
as defined in 1 U.S.C. § 1. See JASTA, supra note 205, at § 4(a). 1 U.S.C. § 1
(2012) provides that “unless the context indicates otherwise,” the word
“person” includes “corporations, companies, associations, firm,
partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as
individuals.”
The preamble to JASTA states that the decision in Halberstam v.
Welch, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983) provides “the proper legal
framework” for how aiding and abetting and conspiracy liability should
function “in the context of” the ATA. JASTA, supra note 205, § 2(a)(5).
Halberstam provides a very thorough analysis of civil conspiracy and
aiding and abetting liability in the context of a civil action against a
woman whose partner had killed a homeowner during a burglary,
concluding with a cautionary note that “[t]ort law is not, at this juncture,
sufficiently well developed or refined to provide immediate answers to
all the serious questions of legal responsibility and corrective justice. . . .
Precedent, except in the securities area, is largely confined to isolated
acts of adolescents in rural society.” Id. at 489. In some other contexts, as
the Supreme Court has pointed out, Congress has defined the elements
of aiding and abetting liability very specifically. See Central Bank of
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 181-83 (1994).
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Even assuming a judgment at some point, JASTA appears
not to have changed the law on immunity from execution.240
A more significant barrier might turn out to be a section in
JASTA that allows the court to stay proceedings if the
Secretary of State certifies that the U.S. is engaged in good
faith negotiation with the foreign state or certain other
parties over the claims.241 Of course, that would depend on
the somewhat unlikely prospect of Saudi Arabia agreeing to
enter into good faith negotiations regarding payment of
damages for the 9/11 attacks. Of greater interest is the fact
that Congress again employed a technique of seeming to
make relief available, but providing (or saddling) the
president with the power to preclude judicial resolution.242
Or perhaps even Congress will step in if too many people
take it seriously. The Chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee suggested that Congress might
reconsider JASTA if it triggered a flood of lawsuits.243
240 See Vladeck, The Senate Killed JASTA, supra note 195.
241 JASTA, supra note 205, § 5(c), codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1605B Note
(2016). The request expires after 180 days unless the court renews it
following a recertification by the Secretary of State. For a very useful
analysis, see Vladeck, The Senate Killed JASTA, supra note 195.
242 See text accompanying supra note 171.
243 SeeWilson, supra note 217. Cf. Sant, supra note 135, at 546-47 (noting
expectations voiced by Senator Chuck Grassley and a State Department
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V. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
A. TWOVISIONS OFHUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION
1. COSMOPOLITANISM AND NATIONALISM
In 1991, U.S. ratification of human rights treaties, together
with the opening of American courts to foreigners seeking
remedies for their own governments’ human rights
violations, embodied the prospect of U.S. participation in an
emerging post-Cold War order. Two features of this order
were the United States’ promotion of international trade and
market-oriented domestic policies, and its assumption of the
military role that other states, particularly Japan and
European nations, might otherwise have taken on. U.S.
commitment to human rights and international law
represented a symbolic feature of this order, lending
legitimacy to the U.S. role in it.
In terms of the role of U.S. courts, where might this
cosmopolitan vision have taken us, had it been fulfilled?
Without attempting a detailed answer, two basic principles
may be set out. The first would be a commitment to the full
range of well-established human rights, including economic,
social and cultural rights. The commitment would include
ratification of the major global and regional human rights
official that civil litigation under the ATA, then under consideration,
would be symbolic and rarely used).
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treaties. Reservations would be limited, and not aimed at
generally bringing treaty obligations into conformity with
existing domestic law. Ratification would include acceptance
of the competence of the treaty body to hear individual
petitions, where the treaty so provides.
The second concerns the courts: They would be open to the
enforcement of international human rights, as part of a
general U.S. commitment to international law. 244 Treaties
would be domestically enforceable, either through regarding
them as self-executing or through implementing legislation,
as appropriate. Adjudication would be subject to doctrines
relating to standing, justiciability, and other general
doctrines relating to the role of the courts, interpreted in
light of the U.S. commitment to human rights.
The courts, moreover, would be open to civil claims by
foreigner nationals or foreign governments arising out of
serious violations of human rights abroad, whether
committed by U.S. nationals or not. That would not rule out
some distinctions between nationals and foreigners, or the
U.S. government and foreign governments, related to factors
such as the severity of the violation and the degree of its
connection to the U.S. Nor would this availability rule out
the application of doctrines such as forum non conveniens,
244 For one version of what this would entail, see Koh, supra note 6, at
2371.
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immunity, and extraterritoriality—again, so long as they
were interpreted in light of the U.S. commitment to human
rights.245
This cosmopolitan vision stands in striking contrast to a
more nationalist vision today. This nationalist vision has two
aspects. One is a focus on vindicating the rights of U.S.
citizens as U.S. citizens, not as the subjects of international
human rights law, with far less interest in protecting foreign
nationals or playing a role in vindicating their universal
rights. In this vision, the normal political accountability of a
democratic government is at play: voters expect their
government to be particularly focused on protecting citizens,
not foreigners who are harmed abroad by foreign
governments or other foreign actors. The second is a
reconceptualization of human rights as most urgently
focused on protection against terrorism. One reason for this
reconceptualization may be that terrorism, especially on U.S.
245 Cf. Koh, supra note 6, at 2390 (envisioning an emerging “Federal Rules
of Transnational Civil Procedure”). Richard Haass’s recent prescriptions
for U.S. foreign policy manifest a broadly similar spirit in his advocacy of
“sovereign obligation.” RICHARDHAASS, AWORLD INDISARRAY:
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THECRISIS OF THEOLDORDER 227 (2017).
He emphasizes the weakening of the significance of national borders in a
globalized world and argues that states have some responsibility to
foreign citizens abroad. Id. at 233 (arguing for a “larger approach to
sovereignty, one that includes obligations beyond borders. Call it World
Order 2.0”). See generally id. at 225-55.
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soil, can easily be recast not simply as an attack on
individual human rights but as an almost existential threat
to the nation. Nationalism draws on many sources, one of
which can be “perceived threats to collective dignity and
national well-being.”246
Congress’s silence on the ATS as the Supreme Court has
progressively narrowed its scope can be understood in terms
of this vision. The terrorism litigation that Congress has
promoted involves the protection of U.S. nationals against
heinous acts, whereas the ATS protects foreign nationals.
The federal civil redress for victims of human rights
violations has been reconceived in more nationalist terms,
rooted in protection of U.S. citizens and territory and aimed
at enhancing U.S. foreign policy goals. JASTA represents the
latest example of this trend.
2. CRITIQUE OF THE COSMOPOLITAN VISION
Both visions leave something to be desired. The
cosmopolitan vision carries with it a significant danger. The
aspiration toward a new world order in which the rule of
law prevails could inspire efforts to bring democracy and
human rights to other countries by force, especially in light
246 AVIEL ROSHWALD, THE ENDURANCE OFNATIONALISM: ANCIENT ROOTS
ANDMODERNDILEMMAS 122 (2006). See generally id. at 88-166.
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of the United States’ status as the sole superpower. Koh
himself might be said to exemplify the connection. He was
sharply criticized for taking a broad view of executive power
as the State Department Legal Advisor when he opined that
Congressional approval was not needed for U.S.
intervention into Libya—seemingly in contradiction to his
skepticism about executive power in his academic work.247
In another sense, though, his views of the American
judiciary held a notable consistency with expansive views of
the role of the U.S. in bringing democracy to other countries,
by force if necessary. Transnational public law litigation
represented to him an attractive prospect because U.S. courts
were “uniquely positioned” to help fashion a new
adjudicative order on a global level, “spur[ring] the
recognition of developing global norms.” 248 It is hard to
247 See Paul Starobin, A Moral Flip-Flop? Defining a War, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
6, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/07/opinion/sunday/harold-kohs-
flip-flop-on-the-libya-question.html; Jennifer Steinhauer, Obama Advisor
Defends Libya Policy to Senate, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/29/us/politics/29powers.html. See
Harold Hongju Koh, THENATIONAL SECURITYCONSTITUTION: SHARING
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRAAFFAIR (1990); Harold Hongju Koh,Why
the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-
Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255 (1988).
248 Koh, supra note 6, at 2396, 2398. Koh subsequently defended his
position with respect to Libya, arguing that he had appropriately
interpreted ambiguity in the War Powers Resolution to accommodate the
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avoid the sense that the dialogue with international and
foreign tribunals that he envisioned as part of an
international legal process reshaping the global public order
would be one led by the U.S.249
With its emphasis on a leading role for the U.S., the
cosmopolitan vision overlooks a potentially subversive
feature of ATS litigation. The pervasiveness of U.S. military
and diplomatic involvement worldwide has meant that
seemingly foreign human rights violations often have some
practice of humanitarian intervention, which he said Congress had not
had in mind in 1973. Harold Hongju Koh, The War Powers and
Humanitarian Intervention, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 971, 978-89, 1023-28 (2016).
249 Indeed, this feature becomes explicit in some accounts. See Robert
Knowles, American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution, 41 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 87 (2009) (arguing that U.S. courts can act as a global judicial
forum, providing an otherwise undersupplied public good). Cf. Jonathan
Hafetz, Human Rights Litigation and the National Interest: Kiobel’s
Application of the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality to the Alien Tort
Statute, 28 MD. J. INT’L L. 107, 122 (2013) (“. . . enforcement of
fundamental individual rights in federal court can advance U.S. strategic
interests”). Of course, other critiques of the cosmopolitan vision are
possible as well. For example, Curtis Bradley argues that any judicial
determination of international human rights law is necessarily “a highly
creative process,” Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of International Human
Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 457, 465 (2001), and that judicial
creativity in lawmaking is generally harmful to democracy, id. at 464-69.
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degree of connection to the U.S. While the availability of the
federal courts to hear foreign human rights violations
represents U.S. participation in a global legal order in the
cosmopolitan vision, there is also some potential for ATS
suits to bring that role into question by exposing the ways
that U.S. policy can work against human rights.250
The cosmopolitan vision, moreover, may have been the
agent of its own destruction, by helping to bring about the
rise of today’s more nationalist approach. While the Persian
Gulf War of 1990-1991 did not purport to be about bringing
democracy and human rights to Iraq, the 2003 invasion of
Iraq was justified by many of its supporters as doing just
that. Instead, along with the invasion of Afghanistan, it
inflicted enormous costs on the U.S. It also produced
catastrophic and continuing violence abroad that may seem
to many Americans not only to cast doubt on the very
possibility of achieving universal respect for human rights,
but to have become a source of the terrorist violence that
Congress so assiduously makes a subject of its continuing
legislative attention.251
250 See Part V.B infra.
251 See BARRY POSEN, RESTRAINT: A NEW FOUNDATION FORU.S. GRAND
STRATEGY 24-27 (2014). See also id. at 9-11 (noting connection with
emphasis on global promotion of democracy and the rule of law).
U.MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 24392
3. CRITIQUE OF THE NATIONALIST VISION
Today’s more nationalist vision also has its own
shortcomings. The first relates to the idea of focusing on the
protection of U.S. citizens and territory, rather than on
distant human rights violations committed against
foreigners. The second relates to the focus on terrorism as
the primary concern of human rights.
a) THE PROTECTION OF U.S.
CITIZENS AND TERRITORY
With regard to the first, the aim of privileging the protection
of U.S. citizens and territory seems rather imperfectly
fulfilled by what Congress has actually done. For one thing,
where a terrorist incident abroad harms both Americans and
foreigners, or even foreigners alone, the goal of hitting back
at the perpetrators and their supporters through damage
judgments—something that could protect all Americans—
might be strengthened by allowing foreigners to sue.
Moreover, even as to Americans, Congress’s approach is
quite selective. First, Americans injured abroad by terrorist
acts committed or supported by states not on the State
Department terrorism list are not provided the opportunity
to bring their claims to federal court. Second, the complete
exclusion under the ATA of any possibility of suing the
United States for support of terrorism shows a lack of
concern for potential U.S. victims of U.S.-supported
terrorism abroad. One need not posit that resort to terror is a
routine tool of U.S. foreign policy to acknowledge that the
U.S. has made use of it in the past, as with the Nicaraguan
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contras, for example.252 Third, even as Congress has sought
through JASTA to raise the possibility of somehow holding
Saudi Arabia accountable for the 9/11 attacks, it has done
nothing to make it possible for U.S. nationals to hold foreign
states accountable for human rights violations inflicted on
them abroad.253
Legislation is, however, often imperfect, and can always be
improved. But there at least one danger that could not be
addressed simply by greater care and consistency in crafting
the law. Congress’s concern for the U.S. victims of terrorism
verges on the misleading, while posing the risk of harm to
the domestic institutions that embody the rule of law.
252 In fact, the political reaction to victims of U.S. supported terrorism
abroad has been to blame the victim. The case of Benjamin Linder is only
one example. See Joanne Omang, Republican Lawmakers, Contra Victim’s




253 One way to start would be to modify the FSIA to permit jurisdiction
over claims by U.S. citizens against foreign states for severe violations of
human rights (other than terrorism). Such legislation would, of course,
further embed the distinction between American and foreigner, but it
would at least be true to the nationalist vision of protecting U.S.
nationals.
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There is a strong contrast between the degree of Congress’s
attention to plaintiffs’ cases and the actual effectiveness of its
interventions. The attention has been sustained and detailed
over the years. Some of Congress’s interventions have been
framed in terms of seemingly general changes to the law, as
in the second of the Iranian hostage cases.254 At other times,
as in the first of the Iranian hostage cases,255 it has seemingly
specified an outcome in the case. A similar point may be
made of JASTA.256 At the last minute, before passage in the
Senate, the bill was subject to highly significant revisions.257
It is not surprising that the text of provisions added under
these circumstances may leave something to be desired.
Is this how laws are made? Yes: Legislating is an inherently
messy business. And one would not want to fault last-
minute changes to a bill needed to ensure its passage.258
254 See text accompanying notes 182-183.
255 See text accompanying notes 151-156.
256 For most of that period JASTA was not a major topic public debate,
but that is true of many statutes; and ultimately, with the assistance of
the Saudis’ threats of economic retaliation, it did rise to public attention.
Moreover, the related question of whether to declassify the 28 pages was
debated publicly over a number of years.
257 Vladeck, supra note 195.
258 See Goldhaber, supra note 203 (last-minute JASTA changes helped
ensure its passage).
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What is so remarkable is how often Congress’s interventions
turn out to be ineffective. It approves legislation that appears
to provide strong, effective judicial remedies to U.S. citizens
injured abroad in terrorist incidents, but as the courts
proceed to apply the statutes, barriers to judgment or
execution or both seem to multiply because the legislation is
not as comprehensive as first appears. Similarly, JASTA’s
actual impact—though practically speaking intended as an
intervention into one case (while formulated in a way that
certainly raises the possibility of wider application)—may
prove no more effective at winning judgment for the
plaintiffs than did Congress’s interventions in the Iranian
hostage cases.259
Congressional ineptitude is not the only possible
explanation of this phenomenon. The actual ineffectiveness
of the legislation may not be particularly important to
Congress compared to its primary aim of vying with the
executive for control of foreign policy. That might seem to be
the case with JASTA, for example. There are many in
Congress critical of the United States’ closeness to Saudi
Arabia. Subjecting Saudi Arabia to the spotlight (and, for
foreign states, indignity) of judicial scrutiny may be an end
in itself for some members, or at least more important than
259 See text accompanying supra notes 151-156 and text accompanying
supra notes 182-183.
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whether any actual relief is awarded: Regardless of how the
9/11 litigation ultimately ends, Saudi Arabia will have been
subjected to judicial processes to which states ordinarily
would be immune. By this account, plaintiffs are the victims,
induced by what may be a false prospect of relief to play a
role in a foreign policy struggle between the president and
Congress.260
Congress’s approach, moreover, imposes real costs on the
integrity of the law-making and adjudicative processes. The
threat does not arise, in the first instance, from some high-
minded/handed Congressional intervention into the
judiciary’s business. Rather, it arises when proposed
legislation emanates from parties seeking a litigation
advantage through Congress. The dismissal of the 9/11
claims under the entire tort rule was taken on appeal before
the Second Circuit. JASTA may not cure all the potential
barriers to success on the claims, but before its passage the
260 For an eloquent account of the harms this creates, see Lamberth, supra
note 117, at 18-20. See also Conway, supra note 52, at 763 & n.179 (quoting
Stephen Flatow) (“Maybe American policy is a joke.”) (citing 60 Minutes:
In Memory of Alisa: After Going to Great Lengths to Get the Right to Sue a
Terrorist State, a Victim’s Father Finds His Own Government Won’t Let Him
Collect His Settlement (CBS, Oct. 4, 1998)). How to resolve this dilemma is
another matter; the concerns as to how foreign governments might react
to fully facilitating such lawsuits at all stages, including execution, are
real.
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lead counsel for plaintiffs publicly stated that he expected
the Second Circuit to remand the case to the district court
once JASTA became law, and that is what happened.261 It is
almost as if the plaintiffs appealed the district court’s
dismissal to Congress, bypassing the Second Circuit.262 By
this account, the courts are the victim, first charged by
Congress with adjudicating claims suffused with difficult
foreign policy issues, and then by-passed when they come
out with the wrong result.
At the same time, it is Congress’s job to legislate. There is
certainly no reason to think the present state of the law
regarding the litigation of foreign terrorism claims is perfect.
Sometimes a pending case may expose serious deficiencies
in existing law. In that situation, counsel to the parties
experiencing those deficiencies in court can be in a
261 See Goldhaber, supra note 203 (quoting one of plaintiffs’ counsel, Sean
Carter of Cozen O’Connor); text accompanying supra note 221.
262 The change.org petition in favor of JASTA promised that it would
“reverse appalling erroneous court decisions on aiding terrorists.” Act
Now to Pass the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA),
CHANGE.ORG, https://www.change.org/p/act-now-to-pass-the-justice-
against-sponsors-of-terrorism-act-jasta. Section 7 of JASTA provides that
it is retroactive. JASTA, supra note 205, §7 (applies both to actions
“pending on, or commenced on or after, the date of enactment” of
JASTA, and to actions “arising out of an injury to a person, property, or
business on or after September 11, 2001”).
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particularly good position to explain them to elected
representatives.
The Supreme Court faced this question in Bank Markazi v.
Peterson. 263 That case involved a set of claims mainly
stemming from the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine
barracks in Beirut. Plaintiffs had secured a default judgment
against Iran.264 They sought to execute on what they said
were the assets of Bank Markazi, Iran’s central bank, held in
a Citibank account in New York controlled by Clearstream,
an international clearinghouse. Plaintiffs first sought to
enforce their judgment against these bonds in 2008; when
these assets were frozen by the President in 2012, plaintiffs
asserted that the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002
rendered the assets available to satisfy the judgment.265 Bank
Markazi and Clearstream, however, asserted a number of
substantive and procedural defenses against execution.
While the case was pending, Congress quashed these
defenses with the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human
Rights Act of 2012.266 Referring specifically to the default
263 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016).
264 Id. at 1319-20. See Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 264 F. Supp. 2d
46 (D.D.C. 2003).
265 136 S. Ct. at 1318, 1320-21. See note 156 supra.
266 Pub. L. No. 112-158, § 502, 126 Stat. 1258 (Aug. 10, 2012), codified at 22
U.S.C. § 8772 (2012).
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judgment by its caption and docket number and to the
account in question, Congress provided that so long as the
district court found that the assets were indeed Iran’s alone,
they would be “subject to execution,” regardless of foreign
sovereign immunity or any other defense.267
Bank Markazi challenged Congress’s action as a violation of
separation of powers. The Supreme Court upheld the
statute, citing Congress’s power to legislate even as to a
single individual and to establish new law, even
retroactively and in pending cases.268 Interestingly, the Court
suggested that judicial deference was particularly
appropriate because the statute related to foreign affairs and
sovereign immunity.269 One wonders whether a statute that
did not simply define aiding and abetting liability in
pending cases but mandated that it be found in a particular
267 Id. See 136 S. Ct. at 1318-19.
268 136 S. Ct. at 1322-28. Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice
Sotomayor, dissented. Id. at 1329 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). United States
v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871), was held to be less about a lack of
Congressional authority to direct an outcome in a pending case than
about its lack of authority to direct the courts to act in a way contrary to
the president’s pardon power under Article II § 2 cl. 1 of the
Constitution. 136 S. Ct. at 1323-24.
269 Id. at 1328-29; see id. at 1329 (“it remains Congress’ prerogative to alter
a foreign state’s immunity and to render the alteration dispositive of
judicial proceedings”).
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case would also survive scrutiny.270 The one line Congress
cannot cross is reopening final judgments.271
In some ways the Court’s hesitance is understandable.
Determining when Congressional action is sufficiently
general in scope to qualify as legislation would be as
impractical as determining whether a statute had provided a
sufficiently “intelligible principle” to survive a non-
delegation challenge.272 It is not the Court’s business to tell
Congress how to legislate.
Still, when terrorism litigation follows a path through
Congress, it is unlikely that Congress will effectively hear
from both sides, since—as Saudi Arabia and Iran both
discovered—foreign states accused of supporting terrorism
meet with little sympathy, at least in public. To be sure, the
administration may provide an alternative view, with some
impact; but where Congress is engaged in a struggle with
270 It might be enough under Bank Markazi for Congress to leave some
near-ministerial fact-finding role for the trial court, like finding that
Saudi agent X had in fact made a certain payment to Y. See id. at 1325
n.20; id. at 1335 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (statute left “plenty of nothing”
for the trial court to determine, and “apparently, nothing is plenty for the
Court”).
271 Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
272 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935) (quoting
Hampton v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).
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the executive over the direction of foreign policy (as was the
case with JASTA), it may not be inclined to listen. Moreover,
terrorism cases attract high-powered and sophisticated
counsel; may involve powerful businesses, such as insurers
as plaintiffs alongside individual victims and their relatives;
and raise the prospect of hundreds of millions or even
billions of dollars in damages—or, as in the 9/11 case, $150
to $250 billion.273 It is true that concerns about the potential
for highly focused interest groups with significant financial
resources to influence legislation are hardly unique to this
area. Nor is there any reason to suspect unlawful or
unprofessional conduct here. The danger, though, is that
because any bill emanating from Congress will be “fighting
terrorism,” the usual scrutiny one might hope to see of such
a fraught process—fraught not only because of the human
suffering behind the claims but also because of the exposure
273 See Goldhaber, supra note 203. The prospect is certainly a worry for
counsel for banks. See Carlos F. Concepción and Johanna Oliver
Rousseaux, Evolution of the ATA and Third-Party Liability for Terrorist Acts,




Evolution%20of%20the%20ATA.pdf (predicting a wave of lawsuits in
light of JASTA’s aiding and abetting provision against not only banks
but also “communication providers, social media outlets, means of
transportation, weapons and other equipment manufacturers, and even
sovereign states”).
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to worrisome influence that our campaign finance system
fosters—may be diminished. Congress may well exercise
some caution in dictating outcomes in particular cases, but
as its caution stems less from sober consideration of foreign
policy concerns than from a fear of too clearly taking on
responsibility, transparency is likely to suffer.
b) The Focus on Terrorism
The second concern relates to the focus on terrorism as the
primary concern of human rights. This focus might not be
obviously wrong-headed. Congress might believe that
putting federal judicial redress for terrorism at center stage
would best serve justice and U.S. foreign policy interests.
One reason for focusing on terrorism in the pursuit of these
ends might be the relative narrownessof terrorism as a
category as opposed to human rights. Human rights treaties
are notable for their breadth, and a general commitment to
have the courts enforce them—at the behest of foreigners as
well as citizens—could be thought to be too broad and
vague. The Sosa Court expressed this anxiety, raising the
specter (assuming, of course, personal jurisdiction) that
every brief stop of a foreign national by a foreign police
officer in a foreign country could be challenged in federal
court as “arbitrary detention” in violation of international
human rights law. The courts could be swamped by endless
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litigation over relatively small human rights violations.274 As
for the latter, large damage judgments against terrorists and
their supporters, including states, would provide
compensation to victims of a particularly heinous kind of
human rights violation. And they might impede future
terrorist attacks by disrupting terrorist financing.275
The problem with this understanding of Congressional
legislation, however, is that it rests on a fundamentally false
understanding of terrorism. “Terrorism” is an unstable,
shifting concept—a concept, moreover, with a great
tendency to expand in scope.276 As is well known, terrorism
274 Koh, supra note 6, at 2396, 2398.
275 To be sure, there are other ways to accomplish these objectives.
Disruption of financial networks supporting terrorist organizations can
be pursued through the criminal law, asset seizures, and bank
regulation; and compensation can be pursued through compensation
programs, as happened with the Iranian hostages. David M.
Herszenhorn, Americans Held Hostage in Iran Win Compensation 36 Years
Later, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2015. Congress need not even provide the
funding for the compensation, if it is willing to use frozen assets of
foreign states or (as was the case with the compensation to the hostages)
funds made available by the imposition of penalties on banks that violate
sanctions laws. Id. But Congress might plausibly want damage suits
against terrorists to be part of the mix.
276 See, e.g., Alex Schmid, Terrorism—The Definitional Problem, 36 CASEW.
RES. J. INT’L L. 375 (2004). The literature on whether “terrorism” can be
defined with sufficient precision to be the subject of an international law
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was left out of the crimes covered by the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, with the conference stating
that there is “no generally acceptable definition” of it.277
norm is extensive. For a comprehensive analysis, see BEN SAUL, DEFINING
TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008). Of course, there are arguments
that terrorism does have that specificity. E.g., Thomas Weatherall, The
Status of the Prohibition of Terrorism in International Law; Recent
Developments, 46 GEO. J. INT’L L. 589, 625 (2015) (prohibition has attained
peremptory norm status); Van Schaack, supra note 50, at 468-73 (arguing
that “terrorism” meets the test of Sosa that a tort be “specific, universal,
and obligatory” in order to qualify under the ATS). See Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 748 (2004) (quoting In re Estate of Marco Human
Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)). But proposed
consensus definitions often come at the expense of implicitly taking
highly controversial positions on important issues. E.g., Van Schaack,
supra note 50, at 443-44 (limiting it to “international terrorism” where
there is some foreign element involved, thereby excluding domestic
terrorism); Weatherall, supra, at 626-27 (suggesting that application of
prohibition of terrorism to peoples in “revolt against oppressive and
abusive regimes risks undermining the international crime of
terrorism”). Cf. ACLU, How the USA PATRIOT Act Redefines “Domestic
Terrorism,” https://www.aclu.org/other/how-usa-patriot-act-redefines-
domestic-terrorism_ (noting potential for definition of “domestic
terrorism” to encompass civil disobedience protests).
277 Resolution E, annexed to the Final Act of the UN Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on an ICC, (17 July 1998), UN Doc
A/Conf.183/10, quoted in in SAUL, supra note 276, at 182. See also
ELIZABETH STUBBINS BATES, TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
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There is not even agreement among academics over whether
terrorism currently has a meaningful definition under
international law.
Nevertheless, “terrorism” is a supremely powerful concept,
with a great capacity to entirely delegitimize the persons or
entities so labelled.278 This feature accounts for the tendency
of its invocation to expand to more and more types of
wrongs. (In this sense “terrorism” curiously parallels the
concept of jus cogens.) The most notable such expansion—
and one highly relevant to JASTA—is the pressure to move
states ever closer to the focal point of concern about
terrorism, something that Congress has grappled with again
and again over the years.
The term “terrorism” has most often applied to acts
committed by non-state, private actors. The ATA as enacted
in 1990 appeared to focus on exclusively on it. But as early as
1996, Congress began to take aim at states and state officials
deemed sponsors of terrorism, amending the FSIA—and its
legislative interventions have continued apace ever since.
ACCOUNTABILITY, REMEDIES AND REFORM (A Report of the IBA Task Force
on Terrorism) §§ 4.05, 4.06, at pp. 165-66 (2011).
278 SAUL, supra note 61, at 1-7.
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In one sense this expansion of liability from non-state actors
to states might be defensible. The distinction between public
and private is hardly impermeable, as human rights law
itself has shown.279 Perhaps, as Vincent-Joël Proulx argues,
terrorism requires a fundamental re-thinking of the
international law of state responsibility.280 What is needed,
he argues, is a strict-liability basis for holding states
responsible for terrorist activities originating within their
territory, thus extending liability to states that have been
“willfully blind [to] or overly tolerant” of terrorist groups
operating within their borders.281
To the extent that Congress thought it was providing
facilitating civil actions against Saudi Arabia for supporting
terrorism when it enacted JASTA, it may have been
grappling with the difficult question of a state’s
responsibility for grievous human rights violations that it
does not directly commit through its agents as a matter of
279 E.g., Bonita C. Meyersfeld, Reconceptualizing Domestic Violence in
International Law, 67 ALBANY L. REV. 371, 393-98 (2003).
280 VINCENT-JOËL PROULX, TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM AND STATE
ACCOUNTABILITY: A NEW THEORY OF PREVENTION 315 (2012) (arguing that
“[s]hort of egregious and active/direct support by a subsidising
government,” establishing state responsibility for actions of terrorist
groups is nearly impossible).
281 Id. at 229-307; 317-319. See also SAUL, supra note 61, at 196-197.
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policy. But, aside from the serious doubt as to whether
aiding and abetting claims are viable against a state under
JASTA,282 there is reason to question whether JASTA reflects
any general interest on Congress’s part in the scope of state
responsibility. Indeed, it has shown no interest in the very
same issue in a related context. Congress has remained silent
through the near-evisceration of ATS claims against
multinational corporations—another kind of non-state actor
that, like terrorists (though obviously very different in other
respects) poses deep conceptual challenges to state-centered
approaches to international law.
Of course, Congress is not required to legislate on every
challenge it might legitimately take up. What is notable,
however, is that Congress’s willingness in some contexts
simply to treat the designation of state responsibility for
terrorism as a matter of pure politics—either on the part of
the executive (in the case of states on the terrorism list) or
Congress (as in the case of JASTA’s effective singling out of
Saudi Arabia). Congress’s main approach to responsibility
for terrorism turns out to be to use it an instrument for
pressuring states in disfavor with the U.S. foreign policy.
282 See text accompanying supra notes 234-239.
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B. BEYOND THE TWO VISIONS: OVERCOMING THE
MISCONCEPTION OF “FOREIGNCUBED”
Both the cosmopolitan and nationalist visions have
significant flaws. Fully articulating an alternative vision of
the role of federal civil redress for foreign human rights
violations would be a major task. Here I confine myself to
setting out its core feature. This alternative would conform
with the cosmopolitan vision in one sense, recognizing the
blurring of the global and the local. But it would disentangle
that recognition from the normative aspiration of using
human rights litigation in federal courts to contribute to the
growth of a global legal order. The major systemic value of
such litigation lies, instead, in its potential to subject U.S.
foreign policy to greater democratic scrutiny, by increasing
awareness of the potential for U.S. actions abroad to
undermine human rights.283
While official support for human rights has been part of U.S.
policy since the Carter Administration, in practice U.S.
actions abroad can also inflict grave harms on human rights.
In pursuit of broader strategic aims in the Middle East, for
example, the U.S. has consistently provided intelligence and
material support to the brutal intervention in Yemen,
283 See Stephen J. Schnably, The Santiago Commitment as a Call to Democracy
in the United States: Evaluating the OAS Role in Haiti, Peru, and Guatemala,
25 U. MIAMI INT.-AM. L. REV. 393, 556-87 (1994).
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notwithstanding mounting evidence of major violations of
international humanitarian law by the military coalition of
Saudi Arabia and eight other Middle Eastern states. 284
Opting for what it saw as stability in 2010, the U.S. backed
Nouri al-Maliki’s effort to remain as Iraq’s prime minister
after his party lost the elections that year, and put no
pressure on him to pull back from the highly sectarian
approach of his government, with its systematic repression
of Sunnis.285 U.S. military aid to Colombia, aimed at fighting
drug trafficking and terrorism, profoundly shaped policy
options there in the direction of militarization; in turn the
Colombian military’s cooperation or complicity with
284 E.g., Amnesty International Report 2016/17, Yemen 2016/2017,
https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-north-
africa/yemen/report-yemen/; U.N. Experts Warn Saudi-Led Coalition
Allies Over War Crimes in Yemen, REUTERS, Jan. 29, 2017,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-un-
idUSKBN15D0SB; Mark Mazzetti & Shuaib Almosawa, Support for Saudi
Arabia Gives U.S. Direct Role in Yemen Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2016;
Mark Mazzetti & Eric Schmitt, Quiet Support for Saudis Entangles U.S. in
Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, March 13, 2016
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/14/world/middleeast/yemen-
saudi- us.html.
285 Ned Parker, The Iraq We Left Behind: Welcome to the World’s Next Failed
State, 91 FOR. AFF. 94, 96-98 (March/April 2012); Renad Mansour, The
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paramilitary forces boosted the latter, and provided
Colombian elites and multinational corporations with a
brutal resource in contests with land activists and union
organizers.286
The impact of U.S. policy options may often be relatively
subtle, but no less real. Paraguay provides an instructive
example of this impact in the context of two different wars
on terrorism. A close examination is especially appropriate
to an appraisal of the current fate of the Filártiga revolution.
The first war on terrorism had its roots in the coup against
the Allende government in Chile on September 11, 1973. As
John Dinges observes, the coup was “not just another
military takeover,” but the “beginning of a total war justified
as a ‘war on terrorism,’” whose “larger goal quickly became
the eradication of all traces of political movements akin to
Allende’s—in all of Latin America.”287 Ultimately Operation
Condor—an alliance of like-minded Latin American military
governments operating with at least tacit support from the
286 SeeWilliam Avilés, Institutions, Military Policy, and Human Rights in
Colombia, 28 LAT. AM. PERSP. 31, 37-44 (2001); see id. at 40 (“[I]nternational
actors such as the United States and transnational interests have helped
to strengthen the repressive actors within civil society and the state.”);
Daniel Kovalik,War and Human Rights Abuses: Colombia & the Corporate
Support for Anti-Union Suppression, 2 SEATTLE J. FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 393
(2004).
287 JOHNDINGES, THECONDOR YEARS: HOW PINOCHET ANDHISALLIES
BROUGHT TERRORISM TO THREECONTINENTS 3 (2004).
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United States—extended its ambitions globally, with
operations and planned operations in the United States and
Europe. Paraguay’s participation in Operation Condor forms
a crucial context to the torture and murder of Joelito
Filártiga. When Filártiga was decided, moreover, Paraguay
was becoming a focus of criticism by the Carter
administration for its human rights violations. The case
played a role in heightening awareness of U.S. support for
the Stroessner regime. A close look at the context of the
Filártiga case shows how unrealistic it is to depict it as a case
about distant foreign wrongs.
The second war on terrorism began after the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001, with President Bush proclaiming a
“war on terror” that would “not end until every terrorist
group of global reach has been found, stopped, and
defeated.”288 This war on terror, so different in its genesis
and aims from the first, shared one characteristic with the
earlier one: its global reach and pervasive impact, blurring
the distinctions between domestic and foreign. Perhaps
surprisingly, a closer look at Paraguay is instructive here as
well. Paraguay today has a functional electoral democracy,
and, while its record is far from perfect, it is not typically
cast as a major human rights violator. Its interest for the U.S.
288 Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States
Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS OF THEUNITED STATES: GEORGEW. BUSH 1140, 1141 (2001).
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now lies rather in the direct terrorist threat that the Tri-
Border region, partly in Paraguay, is said to pose to the U.S.
In some ways, this transformation parallels the larger shift in
vision described here, from the vindication of human rights
in a global order to a focus on the protection of U.S. citizens
and soil from terrorist attack. But the construction of the Tri-
Border area as a terrorist threat permeates seemingly local
struggles and human rights violations there.
1. PARAGUAY AND FILÁRTIGA
It is common, even in otherwise thoughtful treatments of the
ATS, to see the Filártiga case described as one of “foreign
cubed” cases that Kiobel casts into doubt: foreign plaintiffs
brought claims against a foreign defendant for violations
that occurred in foreign territory. As Ernst Young
summarizes the facts,
[i]n 1976, a Paraguayan police officer named Américo
Norberto Peña-Irala tortured Joelito to death [in
Paraguay] in retaliation for his father’s political
activities. . . . All relevant actors were foreign
nationals: Joelito Filártiga, the torture victim; his
father and sister, who brought the lawsuit as
plaintiffs; and Peña-Irala, the defendant. The events in
question –Filártiga’s torture at the hand of
Paraguayan security personnel in retaliation for his
family’s political opposition to the government—
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occurred in Paraguay without any significant effect in
the United States.289
Missing from this desiccated version, which is entirely
typical,290 is the context of Joelito’s torture and execution.
His arrest came in the context of Operation Condor, a
coordinated, cross-border program of extreme political
repression undertaken by right-wing dictatorships.291 These
289 Young, supra note 15, at 1048-1049. Depending on how one reads
Kiobel, Filártiga itself might survive today because the parties resided in
the U.S. at the time of the action—a fact that played no role in the Second
Circuit’s determination of subject matter jurisdiction. As noted earlier,
however, Filártiga’s survival is by no means assured. See note 91 supra.
290 E.g., STEPHENS, supra note 18, at 8-9; Julian G. Ku, Kiobel and the
Surprising Death of Universal Jurisdiction Under the Alien Tort Statute, 107
AMER. J. INT’L L. 835, 836 (2013) (“two Paraguayan nationals . . . [brought]
an ATS lawsuit against a former Paraguayan government official for
committing torture in Paraguay”); Filártiga v. Peña-Irala: Historic Case,
CENTER FORCONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS,
https://ccrjustice.org/home/what-we-do/our-cases/fil-rtiga-v-pe-irala.
(It was the Center for Constitutional Rights that brought the suit in
Filártiga.) Works that describe the case in depth do of course note the
context. See ACEVES, supra note 7, at 17-21; Harold Hongju Koh, Filártiga
v. Peña-Irala: Judicial Internalization into Domestic Law of the Customary
International Law Norm Against Torture, in INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES
45, 46 (John E. Noyes et al., eds. 2007) (noting that the arrest came amidst
Operation Condor). My point relates to common references to the case in
analyses of its significance for ATS litigation.
291 The best accounts are DINGES, supra note 287, and J. PATRICE
MCSHERRY, PREDATORY STATES: OPERATIONCONDOR ANDCOVERTWAR IN
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included Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay—and
Paraguay.292 The full story of U.S. involvement in Operation
Condor is not known,293 but the U.S. was clearly aware of its
existence and operations294 and provided assistance to the
Latin American “counter-intelligence” agencies that
cooperated across borders as part of Operation Condor.295
LATINAMERICA 7-10 (2005) [hereinafter “MCSHERRY, PREDATORY
STATES”], succinctly lays out its main features. See also J. Patrice
McSherry, Operation Condor as a Hemispheric “Counterterror” Organization,
in CECILIAMENJÍVA&NÉSTOR RODRÍGUEZ, EDS., WHEN STATESKILL: LATIN
AMERICA, THEU.S., AND TECHNOLOGIES OF TERROR 28, 50 (2005)
[hereinafter “McSherry, Operation Condor”].
292 There is a particularly rich source of information in Paraguay’s
“Archive of Terror” uncovered in 1992 and 1993. See DINGES, supra note
287, at 237-241; Katie Zoglin, Paraguay’s Archive of Terror: International
Cooperation and Operation Condor, 32 U. MIAMI INT.-AM L. REV. 57, 61-62
(2001); Keith M. Slack, OPERATIONCONDOR ANDHUMAN RIGHTS: A
REPORT FROM PARAGUAY’SARCHIVE OF TERROR, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 492
(1996). See also Simon Watts, How Paraguay’s “Archive of Terror” Put
Operation Condor in Focus, BBCMAGAZINE, (Dec. 22, 2012),
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-20774985.
293 E.g., Barbara Zanchetta, Between Cold War Imperatives and State-
Sponsored Terrorism: The United States and Operation “Condor”, 39 STUDIES
INCONFLICT& TERRORISM 1084, 1093-1097 (2016),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1159069.
294 For an assessment of U.S. involvement, see MCSHERRY, PREDATORY
STATES, supra note 291, at 116-22, 247-54.
295 See DINGES, supra note 287, at 247-53. As Dinges notes, the U.S. drew
back from its support when Operation Condor, in “Phase Three,” sought
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Two examples make clear the deep connections of Operation
Condor to the U.S. The first is U.S. participation in the
seizure in 1975 by Paraguayan police of the Chilean militant
and radical sociologist Jorge Isaac Fuentes Alarcón soon
after he entered Paraguay from Argentina. 296 It was the
cooperation of Paraguayan and Chilean intelligence officials
in the torture of Fuentes and his fellow revolutionary
Amílcar Santucho that provided the model for Operation
Condor, formalized within the year.297 And it was an FBI
agent who notified Chilean police about the arrest in
Paraguay, after which Fuentes and Santucho were
transferred to Chile, where they were further tortured for
information.298 Fuentes’ address book included three U.S.
residents, one of whom was his sister; the FBI subsequently
to extend its assassinations outside Latin America to the U.S. and
Europe. Id. at 164-74, 249-251.
296 Id. at 82-98, 116-25; McSherry, Operation Condor, supra note 291, at 47.




297 DINGES, supra note 287, at 89-90. For details of his subsequent torture,
see id. at 96-97, 109-10; STELLACALLONI, OPERACIÓNCONDOR, PACTO
CRIMINAL 266-69 (2016), http://www.elperroylarana.gob.ve/wp-
content/uploads/2016/12/operacion_condor_pacto_criminal.pdf.
298 DINGES, supra note 287, at 90-92.
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interrogated her in Texas (without divulging her brother’s
arrest and torture).299
The second example relates to Operation Condor’s activities
with respect to the United States. The most striking is the
Letelier assassination.300 It is certainly correct to portray that
act as one directly implicating the United States’ own
territorial interest; Letelier was assassinated by Chilean
agents on U.S. soil. But it is wrong to view this territorial
connection as placing the case as in some entirely different
category from Filártiga. Even if Letelier had been
assassinated in France—the Pinochet regime planned
assassinations of refugees there as well301—his killing would
have had a real and substantial connection to U.S. activities.
The assassination of Letelier was another Operation Condor
activity, and indeed the lead assassin Michael Townley (a
U.S. citizen raised in Chile) initially aimed to enter the U.S.
on a false Paraguayan passport with the help of the
Stroessner regime.302 Moreover, there is strong evidence that
the U.S. sought to keep that connection, and Pinochet’s own
involvement in the murder, a secret even as it prosecuted the
299 Id. at 92-93.
300 See text accompanying supra note 53.
301 MCSHERRY, PREDATORY STATES, supra note 291, at 141.
302 Id. at 153-54; see id. at 152-63. Dinges also has a thorough account. See
DINGES, supra note 287, at 214-29.
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killers. 303 Another example, less well known but equally
striking, is the Operation Condor threat to assassinate then-
Congressman Edward Koch for his opposition to U.S. aid to
Southern Cone countries with poor human rights records.304
There is no evidence of any direct U.S. involvement in the
torture and murder of Joelito Filártiga. But his death in 1976
came at the end of a long period of U.S. support for and
deep involvement in the regime of Paraguayan dictator
Alfredo Stroessner.305 The U.S. provided substantial military
303 MCSHERRY, PREDATORY STATES, supra note 291, at 152-63.
304 See DINGES, supra note 287, at 214-29.
305 Frank O. Mora, The Forgotten Relationship: United States-Paraguay
Relations, 1937-89, 33 J. CONTEMP. HIST. 451, 457-66 (1998) [hereinafter
“Mora, Forgotten Relationship”]. See also FRANKO.MORA AND JERRYW.
COONEY, PARAGUAY AND THEUNITED STATES: DISTANTALLIES 198 (2007)
[hereinafter “MORA ANDCOONEY, DISTANTALLIES”]:
Between 1954 and 1977 U.S. policy actively served the [Stroessner]
regime’s interests. In addition to the internal power structure created
by the regime during a span of more than two decades (support from
the military, Colorado Party, business circles, and, until the 1970s,
peasantry), another pillar of the regime that sustained it during this
period was the firm and continuous political and economic support
provided by five successive U.S. administrations.
In the 1970s the Nixon administration did press the Stroessner regime on
its complicity in drug trafficking, and pushed successfully for the
extradition to the U.S. of a major drug trafficker under Paraguay’s
protection. Mora, Forgotten Relationship, supra, at 464-66. But as Mora
points out, once the extradition was granted, the U.S. returned to its
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aid, trade benefits, and intelligence assistance to the regime,
the last of which helped it weaken the opposition.306 Joelito’s
father, Joel Filártiga Ferreira, was a prominent opponent,
and that was what cost Joelito his life.307 When former Police
Inspector General Peña-Irala was arrested in Brooklyn in
1979, dissident groups in Paraguay alleged that he was a
member of a police death squad that targeted opponents of
the Stroessner regime.308
By the time of the complaint in the Filártiga case was filed,
Paraguay’s dictator Alfredo Stroessner was falling out of
favor with the United States, a target of the Carter
Administration’s focus on human rights.309 The Filártiga case
policy of strong support for the regime. Id. at 466. See alsoMORA AND
COONEY, DISTANTALLIES, supra, at 186-92.
306 SeeMORA ANDCOONEY, DISTANTALLIES, supra note 305, at 133-181;
Mora, Forgotten Relationship, supra note 305, at 463.
307 ACEVES, supra note 7, at 17-19; MORA ANDCOONEY, DISTANTALLIES,
supra note 305, at 197.
308 Selwyn Raab, Paraguay Alien Tied to Murders in Native Land, N.Y.
TIMES, April 5, 1979, http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-
free/pdf?res=9E0CE4DF1F39E732A25756C0A9629C946890D6CF.
309 SeeMORA ANDCOONEY, DISTANTALLIES, supra note 305, at 193-230;
Mora, Forgotten Relationship, supra note 305, at 466-467. The advent of the
Reagan Administration saw an easing of U.S. pressures over human
rights in Paraguay, but not a complete cessation, in part because of the
Stroessner regime’s involvement in the drug trade, and in part because
of “the need of the Reagan administration to criticize and pressure
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helped draw attention to human rights violations in
Paraguay and U.S. support for Stroessner, and the U.S.
Embassy provided assistance to the Filártiga family as it
sought justice in Paraguay.310
In short, the representation of the Filártiga case as somehow
entirely foreign to the U.S., ending up in U.S. courts only
because of the happenstance that the parties were present in
Brooklyn at the time of the lawsuit, is fundamentally
misleading. It is equally unsatisfactory to point to Filártiga as
the kind of case that perhaps should survive Kiobel on the
ground that the U.S. has an important interest in not
becoming a haven for foreign human rights violators. While
that is correct, it ignores the interest that U.S. citizens have in
learning about their own government’s support for regimes
that violate human rights violations abroad—especially, as
was the case with U.S. support for Operation Condor, in
secrecy.
My point is not that every case casually denominated
“foreign cubed” must have some direct underlying U.S.
connection. But given the United States’ extensive global
involvement, that may often be the case, and many ATS suits
are likely to cast light on some aspect of U.S. conduct
authoritarian regimes like Paraguay and Chile so as to legitimize its anti-
leftist policy in Central America.” Id. at 469. See also id. at 469-73.
310 SeeMORA ANDCOONEY, DISTANTALLIES, supra note 305, at 197.
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relating to human rights. Consider Doe v. Saravia, concerning
a Salvadoran paramilitary group’s assassination of
Archbishop Oscar Romero.311 The assassination was ordered
by Roberto D’Aubisson, a Salvadoran military officer with
close ties to the U.S., including training at the U.S. Army
School of the Americas. There is no evidence of direct U.S.
involvement in the assassination, but lawsuits in the U.S.
relating to it help bring to light the U.S. role in supporting
the Salvadoran military during a period of brutal repression.
As McSherry demonstrates, moreover, the Romero
assassination appears to have been the product of an
Operation Condor-style system in Central America,
established with the aid of Argentinian officers and U.S.
intelligence.312
2. PARAGUAY, THE TRI-BORDER AREA, AND
TERRORISM
Terrorism—the particular focus of the nationalist vision—
reinforces a blurring of the domestic and the international in
the United States’ activities. It is commonplace to remark
that measures taken after 9/11 to prevent further terrorist
attacks carry with them the risk of imposing their own
profound distortions on domestic U.S. politics, through
excessive government secrecy, suppression of speech, and
invasions of privacy, as well as through racial profiling and
311 Doe v. Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112 (E.D. Cal. 2004).
312 MCSHERRY, PREDATORY STATES, supra note 291, at 226.
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demonization of immigrants. Whatever the proper balance
between security and freedom may be, in the U.S. it is at
least a matter for domestic politics and democratic
resolution.
Paraguay again provides an instructive example of this
blurring of domestic and foreign, though in a very different
way from a quarter century ago. It now has an elected
government, though the prior president, Fernando Lugo—
the first President in six decades not from Stroessner’s
Colorado Party—was removed from office in 2012 through a
questionable use of impeachment. 313 While it has real
313 On Lugo’s election, see Diego Abente-Brun, Paraguay: The Unraveling of
One-Party Rule, 20 J. DEMOC. 143 (2009). On his impeachment, see Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, IACHR Expresses Concern Over
Ousting of the Paraguayan President, June 23, 2012 (Press Release 072),
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2012/072.asp.
For analyses, see Rebecca Szucs, A Democracy’s “Poor Performance”: The
Impeachment of Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo, 46 GEO. WASH. INT’L
L. REV. 409, 432-35 (2014) (calling for reform of constitution to provide
more specifical grounds for impeachment); but see Thor Halvorssen,
Paraguay Is Not Honduras: President Lugo’s Impeachment Was Not a Coup,
Forbes.com, July 3, 2012,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/thorhalvorssen/2012/07/03/paraguay-
is-not-honduras/#25c5cfe02228 (arguing that broad legislative power to
impeach is legitimate in light of long history of Stroessner dictatorship).
For useful analyses of the land distribution and ethnic context of Lugo’s
impeachment, see Kregg Hetherington, Paraguay’s Ongoing Struggle over
Land and Democracy, 45(3) NACLA REPORT ON THEAMERICAS, (Fall 2012)
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problems with corruption, systemic discrimination of
campesinos, violence against women and denial of abortion
rights,314 its human rights situation is nowhere as dire as it
was in the Stroessner era, and attracts little attention from
the U.S.
Since the attacks of 9/11, particularly in national security
circles, Paraguay has been the focus of attention for
something else besides its human rights record: terrorism.
This development exemplifies the way in which U.S. anti-
terrorist actions may exercise a profound influence on social,
political, and economic struggles in seemingly distant lands.
The Paraguayan Ciudad del Este, along with Foz do Iguaçu,
Brazil, and Puerto Iguazú, Argentina, make up the Tri-
Border area or Triple Frontera. The area was long known for
its cross-border trade, organized crime, drug trafficking and
smuggling, and its significant population of Arabs and
at 8; Federico Fuentes, Paraguay: Coup at Heart of Struggle over Latin
America, GREEN LEFTWEEKLY, July 14, 2012,
https://www.greenleft.org.au/content/paraguay-coup-heart-struggle-
over-latin-america.
314 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2015/16: THE STATE OF THEWORLD’S
HUMAN RIGHTS 289-291 (2016); Hetherington, supra note 313; Scott W.
Downs, 25 Years of Kleptocracy in Paraguay: Endemic Corruption Perpetuates
Poverty, COUNCIL ONHEMISPHERICAFFAIRS, Aug. 22, 2014,
http://www.coha.org/25-years-of-kleptocracy-in-paraguay-endemic-
corruption-perpetuates-poverty/.
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others of Middle Eastern origin.315 Soon after 9/11, the U.S.
identified the Tri-Border area as a significant potential
315 ARTHUR BERNARDES DOAMARAL, A TRÍPLICE FRONTEIRA E AGUERRA AO
TERROR 206-07 (2010); Benjamin Dangl and April Howard, City of Terror:
Paraguay’s ‘Casbah’ as Terror Central, EXTRA!, (Sept./Oct. 2007),
http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=3197. For useful descriptions of
the region’s cross-border trade, see Carmen Alicia Ferradás, Environment,
Security, and Terrorism in the Trinational Frontier of the Southern Cone, 11
IDENTITIES: GLOBAL STUDIES INCULTURE AND POWER 417, 420-26 (2004);
Jude Webber, Ciudad del Este’s Deadly Trade Route, FINANCIAL TIMES,
March 13, 2010, https://www.ft.com/content/dd80bec8-2be5-11df-8033-
00144feabdc0. For an illuminating analysis of the region’s Middle
Eastern population, the media’s construction of the area as source of
terrorist threat, and the response of the local population, see John Tofik
Karam, Atravesando las Américas: La “Guerra contra el Terror,” los Árabes y
las Movilizaciones Transfronterizas en Foz do Iguaçu y Ciudad del Este, in
VERÓNICAGIMÉNEZ BÉLIVEAU& SILVIAMONTENEGRO, EDS., LA TRIPLE
FRONTERA: DINÁMICASCULTURALES Y PROCESOS TRANSNACIONALES 119
(2010). See also Damián Setton, La Construcción de la Triple Frontera a
Través de los Encuentros Sociales de la Alter-Globalización, in BÉLIVEAU&
MONTENEGRO, supra, at 75, 77 (noting that in the construction of the Tri-
Border area as part of the war on terror and “clash of civilizations,” the
presence of an Arab population is sufficient to establish the existence of
terrorist cells) (“Desde este óptica, la prueba de la existencia de células
terroristas es la misma comunidad árabe que habita la zona.”). For an
example of the wilder claims about the Tri-Border area, see Gregory
Shapiro, Terror Reigns Supreme and the Cycle of Violence Is Seemingly
Endless in the Triple Frontier, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS 895, 896-97 (2003)
(asserting connection based on fact that there are immigrants from
Middle Eastern countries “where the Palestinian terrorists organized and
emerged about fifty years ago).
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terrorist threat. 316 No longer seen as remote, it was
reconceived as a direct threat to U.S. security.317 The result
has been a pressure to “securitize” the Tri-Border area.
316 Among the best critical analyses of the construction of the Tri-Border
area as a situs of potential terrorist threats are BERNARDES DOAMARAL,
supra note 315, at 40-41, 183-233, and SILVIAMONTENEGRO&VERÓNICA
GIMÉNEZ BÉLIVEAU, LA TRIPLE FRONTERA: GLOBALIZACIÓN Y
CONSTRUCCIÓN SOCIAL DEL ESPACIO 67-132 (2006). For an account of the
different ways that Brazilians and Paraguayans view the challenges
facing the region, see Verónica Giménez Béliveau, La “Triple Frontera” y
Sus Representaciones: Políticos y Funcionarios Peinsan la Frontera, FRONTERA
NORTE, 23(46), Dec. 2011, at 7. For examples of the national security
literature, see William W. Mendel, Paraguay’s Ciudad del Este and the New
Centers of Gravity, MILITARY REVIEW (March-April 2002), at 51; Philip K.
Abbott, Terrorist Threat in The Tri-Border area: Myth or Reality?, MILITARY
REVIEW (Sept.-Oct. 2004), at 51; Matthew Levitt, South of the Border, A
Threat from Hezbollah, J. INT’L SECURITYAFF. 77 (Spring 2013); Alma
Keshavarz, Iran and Hezbollah in the Tri-Border areas of Latin America: A
Look at the “Old TBA” and the “New TBA,” SMALLWARS JOURNAL, Nov. 12,
2015, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/iran-and-hezbollah-in-the-
tri-border-areas-of-latin-america-a-look-at-the-%E2%80%9Cold-
tba%E2%80%9D-and-the ; JOSHUA L. GLEIS AND BENEDETTA BERTI,
HEZBOLLAH ANDHAMAS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 71-75 (2012). For a
useful summation of the national security literature—one that played a
key role in promoting the popular perception of the Tri-Border area as a
source of terrorist threat to the U.S.—see Library of Congress, Terrorist
and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border area (TBA) of South America
(Report Prepared by the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress,
under an Interagency Agreement with the Crime and Narcotics Center,
Director of Central Intelligence) (July 2003; rev. Dec. 2010). On the role
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This re-conception depended crucially on the notion that
“terrorism and organized crime are intrinsically
connected,” 318 and on a doubtful conflation of sympathy
among some of the area’s Middle Eastern population for
Hezbollah or other similar organizations with the provision
of financial or operational support for terrorist acts.319 The
more lurid versions labelled the Tri-Border area as the
“Western base” of Hezbollah 320 and recounted possible
played by the Library of Congress report, see Dangl & Howard, supra
note 315.
317 BERNARDES DOAMARAL, supra note 315, at 191 (“[O]s discursos de
securitização da Tríplice Fronteira passariam pelo representação da área
não mais como uma zona remota, mais sim como ameaça direta,
emobora pouco conhecida, à segurança dos Estados Unidos.”). Cf. BARRY
POSEN, RESTRAINT: A NEW FOUNDATION FORU.S. GRAND STRATEGY 173
(2014) (“The U.S. presence across the world has been such a stable
feature, for such a long time, that danger anywhere can seem like a
threat.”).
318 Ana R. Sverdlick, Terrorists and Organized Crime Entrepreneurs in the
“Triple Frontier” Among Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, 9 TRENDS IN
ORGANIZEDCRIME 84 (2005).
319 International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Assessing the Terrorist
Threat in the Tri-Border area of Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina, at 15, 50
(Oct. 2013), http://i-hls.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Assessing-
the-Terrorist-Threat-in-the-Tri-Border-Area.pdf [hereafter “Assessing the
Terrorist Threat”].
320 Pablo Gato and Robert Windrem, Hezbollah Builds a Western Base, NBC
NEWS.COM, 5/9/2007,
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/17874369/ns/world_news-
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meetings of Hezbollah and al Qaeda representatives in
Ciudad del Este.321
In 2002, long-standing collaboration among Brazil,
Argentina and Paraguay over issues related to smuggling,
money laundering, and the like in the Tri-Border area was
formalized into a “3+1 Group on Triborder Area Security,”
with U.S. participation; one of the aims was to “thwart . . .
potential terrorist fundraising activities.” 322 In its 2005
americas/t/hezbollah-builds-western-base/. See also Jeffrey Goldberg, In
the Party of God: Hezbollah Sets Up Operations in South America and the
United States, THENEW YORKER, Oct. 28, 2002; Trish Regan and Andrew
Fisher, In Paraguay, Piracy Bleeds U.S., Aids Terrorists, CNBC.com, Oct. 4,
2007, http://www.cnbc.com/id/21082897.
321 Mike Boettcher, South America’s ‘Tri-Border’ Back on Terrorism Radar,
CNN.com, Nov. 8, 2002,
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/americas/11/07/terror.triborder
/. Nathaniel Greenberg,War in Pieces: AMIA and the Triple Frontier in
Argentine and American Discourse on Terrorism, 8 A CONTRACORRIENTE: A
JOURNAL ON SOCIALHISTORY AND LITERATURE IN LATINAMERICA 61, 79
(2010),
https://www.ncsu.edu/acontracorriente/fall_10/articles/Greenberg.pd
f, has a useful analysis of the way that “fascinated American journalists
. . . have constructed for their reading public a virtual Hobbesian realm
of transcendent infamy in La Ciudad del Este.”
322 UNITED STATESDEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON
TERRORISM 2005, at 157 (2006),
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65462.pdf [hereafter
“2005 TERRORISM REPORT”].
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Country Report on Terrorism, the U.S. expressed concern
that Hezbollah and Hamas might be raising funds in the Tri-
Border area, though it acknowledged that there was “no
corroborated information” of any operational presence by
terrorist groups there. 323 U.S. troops were sent to Paraguay
for 18 months of military training exercises in 2005 to help
counter the alleged terrorist threat emanating from the Tri-
Border area.324 U.S. military assistance to Paraguay spiked
after 9/11, (peaking in 2010 and decreasing since then), but
has continued. 325 Though it periodically denied the existence
of a terrorist presence in the region, and expressed concern
about the detrimental effect of characterizing the region as a
terrorist threat, 326 Paraguay saw in the emphasis on
323 2005 TERRORISM REPORT, supra note 322, at 157.
324 Benjamin Dangl, The US Military Descends on Paraguay, THENATION,
July 12, 2006, https://www.thenation.com/article/us-military-descends-
paraguay/ ; Kelly Hearn, U.S. Military Presence in Paraguay Irks
Neighbors, CHRISTIAN SCIENCEMONITOR, Dec. 2, 2005,
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1202/p25s02-woam.html. See also
COHA Backgrounder on U.S. Paraguay Relations: Why Paraguay Matters,
Aug. 17, 2007, http://www.coha.org/coha-backgrounder-on-us-
paraguay-relations-why-paraguay-matters/; Library of Congress,
Country Profile: Paraguay (Oct. 2005) at 19,
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/cs/profiles/Paraguay-new.pdf .
325 U.S. Military Assistance in Historical Dollars: Paraguay, Quandl.com,
Dec. 3, 2016,
https://www.quandl.com/data/USAID/MILHISTT_PARAGUAY.
326 E.g., DOAMARAL, supra note 315, at 192, 229-30, 233-36. See also No Se
Ha Detectado Evidencia de Terrorismo Operativo en la Región, ABC COLOR,
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terrorism an opportunity to position itself as a major
regional ally of the U.S. 327
The effect was to reconceive the Tri-Border area as another
point in an international terrorist network threatening the
U.S., as dangerous to it as Afghanistan or Pakistan.328 When
U.S. troops came to Paraguay in 2005, the Paraguayan
government, at that time still under the decades-long rule of
Stroessner’s Colorado Party, accused campesino
organizations agitating for land redistribution of ties to
terrorism, giving rise to fears of a crackdown on opposition
(Jan. 10, 2008) http://www.abc.com.py/edicion-impresa/locales/no-se-
ha-detectado-evidencia-de-terrorismo-operative-en-la-region-
1036850.html (reports by Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay that there is no
reliable evidence of terrorism in the Tri-Border area). But see Assessing the
Terrorist Threat, supra note 319, at 51 (arguing that the public denials by
the three countries of any terrorist presence in the Tri-Border area “is
nuanced by the concern expressed by the security forces and their
engagement in counterterrorism operations, sometimes in collaboration
with international actors”).
327 E.g., BERNARDES DOAMARAL, supra note 315, at 252. See also id. at 256
(noting that Argentina was the most, and Brazil, the least, receptive to
the portrayal of the Tri-Border area as a terrorist threat, with Paraguay
falling in between); Christine Folch, Trouble on the Triple Frontier: The
Lawless Border Where Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay Meet, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, (Sept. 6, 2002)
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/argentina/2012-09-
06/trouble-triple-frontier.
328 MONTENEGRO&GIMÉNEZ BÉLIVEAU, supra note 316, at 235.
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with U.S. support. 329 As have Argentina and Brazil, to
varying extents, Paraguay has enacted counter-terrorism
laws in recent years and increased its surveillance of the
area.330
The securitization of the Tri-Border area has had a
significant impact on regional political struggles there. Local
conflicts over natural resources in the area regularly feature
accusations that U.S. attention to potential terrorism there
masks an interest in controlling the Guaraní Aquifer, one of
the world’s largest sources of fresh water. 331 Land
ownership, heavily concentrated, is a source of contest, with
peasant activism over what are alleged to be illegal grants of
state land to wealthy supporters of the former Stroessner
regime. The price of activism can be high. In 2014, for
example, a leading land activist, Eusebio Torres, was
murdered in 2014—possibly with the complicity of security
forces—after receiving death threats for his work.332 Further,
329 Dangl, supra note 324.
330 Assessing the Terrorist Threat, supra note 319, at 45-50.
331 Ferradás, supra note 315, at 433-36; MONTENEGRO&GIMÉNEZ
BÉLIVEAU, supra note 316, at 116-23, 211-22. See id. at 220 (noting concern
of activists that “se propone ahora instalar en las sociedades el miedo a la
presencia de terroristas en la frontera tripartite entre Argentina, Brasil y
Paraguay con el objetivo de controlar recursos aún más escasos y
necesarios en el future: el agua y la biodiversidad”).
332 UNITED STATESDEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ONHUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2014, Paraguay,
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peasants forced off the land by a soy production boom
dominated by multinationals and Paraguay’s landowning
elite, and already operating at the margins of the economy,
find themselves ever more effectively excluded from
poaching on the Green Corridor currently being created in
the area; heightened security in response to the alleged
terrorist threat makes entry into environmental reserves
even more difficult. A new enclosure of land takes shape,
one that puts blame on the poor for practices harmful to the
environment “without examining the economic inequalities
that often force them into certain practices.”333 Similarly, the
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?
year=2014&dlid=236708; Julia Varela, Paraguay: Soja y Sicarios detrás del
Crimen de un Dirigente Campesino, COSECHA ROJA, March 20, 2014,
http://cosecharoja.org/paraguay-soja-y-sicarios-detras-del-crimen-de-
un-dirigente-campesino/. Torres was active in Alto Paraná, the capital of
which is Ciudad del Este. Id. Human rights organizations in Paraguay
reported that “between 1989 and 2013, landowners were responsible,
with the complicity of local authorities and security forces, for the deaths
of 115 peasant leaders and land reform activists.” COUNTRY REPORTS ON
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2014, supra. See also UNITED STATES




333 Ferradás, supra note 315, at 429; id. at 430; see id. at 432-33 (“most
peasants and small farmers today are excluded from the Green Corridor
plans and are in fact constructed as posing major threats to the
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region’s long-standing cross-border smuggling and illicit
trade becomes even more difficult with greater government
scrutiny, motivated by concerns about terrorism, of all
movements across national borders in the Tri-Border area.334
In short, theU.S. designation of the area as a source of terrorist threat is a significant
factor (though far from the only one) in shaping the political space
in the Tri-Border area.335
sustainability of the forests”); Jeremy Hobbs, Paraguay’s Destructive Soy
Boom, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/03/opinion/paraguays-
destructive-soy-boom.html.
334 Ferradás, supra note 315, at 431-433, 436-39. See id. at 438 (“Besides
believing they are victims of a green market-friendly securitization [of
areas previously open to peasants and indigenous peoples], many
organizers also think that they are the true targets of recent forms of
bilateral military securitization, which they perceive as imperialist
attempts to seize resources and control civil protest.”). The vision of the
area as part of a Green Corridor serving environmental and tourism
purposes is in some ways a return to an earlier construction of the
region. See Carmen Ferradás, How a Green Wilderness Became a Trade
Wilderness; The Story of a Southern Cone Frontier, POLAR, 21(2), Nov. 1998,
at 11, 20.
335 SeeMONTENEGRO&GIMÉNEZ BÉLIVEAU, supra note 316, at 238
(referring to extensive North American media coverage of the Tri-Border
area as a hotbed of terrorism):
[L]a prensa norteamericana, a través de su insistente referencia a la TF
[Triple Frontera] como objeto cerrado, la ha creado. Y los actors
locales, aún no acordando con las definiciones de la prensa, no
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Paraguay, then, exemplifies the falsity of the sharp division
between national and foreign—as to both territory and
citizens—that the nationalist vision assumes.336 It strongly
counsels against too easy assumptions about the
“foreignness” of seemingly distant territory. If relatives of
one of the many land activists murdered in or near the Tri-
Border area were to bring an ATS suit against Paraguayan
officials, it would be deeply unrealistic to view the lawsuit
as yet another instance of a purely foreign matter somehow
landing in U.S. courts. Greater realism about the many ways
that U.S. policy can deeply affect foreign nationals reveals
how unsupportable is the claim that that such lawsuits are
not only “foreign,” but foreign many times over: foreign-
cubed.
pueden sino tomarlas como referencia a la hora de hablar de la
región. A su vez, la representación de la TF, una vez instalada,
aparece a los ojos de ciertos actores como un argumento que debe ser
respondido: en este sentido, los medios de prensa norteamericanos
han conseguido imponer su vision de la region.
336 Of course, it is not only the United States’ global counter-terrorism
efforts that have the potential to shape or constrain local disputes over
land and other natural resources, such as water. U.S. support for the
economic restructuring along the lines of the “Washington Consensus”
can have a similar effect, for example. For a comprehensive analysis in
the context of Bolivia, see BENJAMINKOHL& LINDA FARTHING, IMPASSE IN
BOLIVIA: NEOLIBERALHEGEMONY AND POPULAR RESISTANCE (2006).
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Finally, in addition to providing what may often be the only
practical forum for seeking justice, ATS lawsuits may
represent an instance of universal jurisdiction under
international law. But giving concrete form to a legal order
of universal human rights need not be seen as the sole (or
even primary) systemic benefit they bring. Federal civil
litigation to vindicate human rights can help put a spotlight
on U.S. policies and actions that may be harmful to human
rights elsewhere. This perspective on ATS actions may help
avoid the tendency toward hegemony that the cosmopolitan
vision too easily slips into.337
One might ask whether terrorism litigation could fulfill the
same function as ATS litigation. That seems unlikely.
Whatever human rights wrongs the U.S. may have
committed, they do not include committing terrorist acts
against U.S. nationals. The closest analogue might be the
9/11 lawsuits, which could be viewed as putting a spotlight
337 See supra Part V.A.2. In this regard, my approach differs from the
thoughtful argument that Lewis advances against the growing trend in
U.S. terrorism statutes to build upon a sharp contrast between what is
foreign and what is domestic. Her concern is that the polarizing effect of
“America-first” policies may well undermine U.S. soft power globally (as
well as promote anti-immigrant sentiment within the U.S.). Lewis, supra
note 127 , at 679-83. My concern here, however, is with the way in which
the sharp distinction can undercut domestic U.S. appreciation of the ill
effects that U.S. policy can have on human rights abroad, by constructing
those effects as taking place in distant lands.
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on the United States’ closeness to a major ally that (plaintiffs
assert) bears responsibility for a terrorist attack here. That
would be quite a revelation, but the ongoing battles in the
courts and Congress seem fundamentally less about what
the Saudis did than about than what it takes to be legally
responsible for terrorist actions.338 It is claims by foreigners
for wrongs committed against them abroad that have the
potential to serve this spotlight function.
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress’s continuing legislative efforts to provide civil
remedies to U.S. nationals injured by terrorism might seem
unsurprising. The primary focus of any democratic
government is the welfare of its citizens and the security of
its territory. But the way in which Congress has done so
serves all too well to cast foreignness as a source of threat. In
terrorism litigation it is foreign states and foreign
organizations that cause terrorism; and U.S. nationals who
are injured. In this context, Congress’s silence as the
Supreme Court has dealt grievous blows to the ATS is just as
unsurprising. Human rights violations committed against
338 The Halberstam standard commended by Congress in approving
JASTA would likely dispense with any requirement of specific
knowledge of such actions; the proposed amendment to JASTA offered
by Senators McCain and Graham after its passage would make such
knowledge indispensable. See supra note 239 and text accompanying
supra note 220.
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foreigners by foreign governments in foreign territory come
to be seen as irrelevant to the welfare of the U.S., and
concern grievances held by and against dangerous others.
As of now, it would seem, the nationalist vision has
triumphed over the cosmopolitan one: The ambition of
helping to build a global rule of law through the use of
universal jurisdiction has been displaced by a determination
to prioritize American interests and safety. It is a
displacement that finds resonance in the ascension of a
President who promises to put “America First” and protect
its citizens from the “ravages” that foreign countries have
inflicted on us.339
The labels “cosmopolitan” and “nationalist” may be
misleading in one respect, however, because what I call the
“nationalist” vision does not necessarily signify withdrawal
from global affairs. Notably, President Trump promised that
“[w]e, the citizens of America . . . will determine the course
of America and the world for years to come.”340 This is less a
call for disengaging from foreign affairs than for calibrating
339 Inaugural Address, Jan. 20, 2017,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/inaugural-address. SeeMatt
Flegenheimer & Michael Barbaro, Donald Trump Is Elected President
Stunning Repudiation of the Establishment, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2016.
340 Inaugural Address, supra note 339 (emphasis added).
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U.S. foreign policy “with the understanding that it is the
right of all nations to put their own interests first.”341
The weaponization of human rights litigation is one
outgrowth of this nationalist perspective. Severing the
connection between global justice and federal civil litigation
over severe human rights abuses (including terrorism)
makes it all too easy to turn that litigation into a weapon to
be deployed selectively against foreign states. It should not
occasion too much surprise when U.S. citizens, and possibly
the integrity of the courts, become collateral damage in this
deployment. When Congress legislates with the primary aim
of showing displeasure with a long-time ally falling out of
favor, or of asserting its primacy in foreign affairs against the
executive branch, there is no particular reason to expect that
the law will work in a way that is comprehensible to the
victims of terrorism whom the law purportedly protects.
Nor is there reason to have full confidence that Congress
will resist the temptation to tell the courts how to decide
particular cases.
JASTA fully exemplifies these features. Granted, it slips at
times into precisely the kind of blurring of the distinction
between national and foreign that, as I have argued, a more
realistic view of the relation of ATS claims to the U.S. would
341 Id. See alsoMichael D. Shear and Jennifer Steinhauer, Trump to Seek $54
Billion Increase in Military Spending, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2017.
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highlight. What, after all, is an act of international terrorism
that occurs “in the United States” and yet is “primarily
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States” or
“transcends national boundaries”?342 But for the most part
its agenda is clear, even if its ultimate legal impact is not: A
foreign state that (it is said) inflicted or helped to inflict
terrible harm on U.S. citizens on U.S. soil must be made to
pay, and must be pried away from presidents who treat it as
an ally. Whatever one thinks about this agenda, it has no
place for vindication of the wrongs inflicted by Saudi Arabia
on citizens of other states, including Yemen, with U.S.
support.
While Congress remains focused on terrorism legislation, the
ATS is set to remain severely limited for the foreseeable
future. It may not always be so. A long period of desuetude
has been the fate of important provisions of the Constitution
throughout history. The Fifteenth Amendment, for example,
lay dormant from the end of Reconstruction to the
enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.343
The comparison is not extravagant. In view of its
provenance, we might even regard the ATS as semi-
constitutional. It is a part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, “the
342 See text accompanying supra notes 227-230.
343 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (Aug. 6,
1965).
U.MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 24438
last of the triad of founding documents, along with the
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution itself,”
and “the genesis of our Nation’s continuing constitutional
revolution.”344 Like the Constitution, the ATS has spawned
endless interpretations and even theories of interpretation.
Original intent is one of the most commonly seen theories
today in ATS scholarship, with a keen focus on what the
First Congress, whose members included a number of the
framers, had in mind.345 But there is no reason why a proper
interpretation of the text of the ATS could not take into
account its current context, as with any statute. As protean
in its language as the Constitution, and nearly as long-lived,
the ATS may one day again find favor in the courts.
344 Sandra Day O’Connor, The Judiciary Act of 1789 and the American
Judicial Tradition, 59 CINN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1990). The statute was recodified
several times with minor modifications. See Bradley, supra note 5, at 587
n.2.
345 E.g., David Wallach, The Alien Tort Statute and the Limits of Individual
Accountability in International Law, 46 STAN. J. INT’L L. 121 (2010)
(proposing to limit ATS to violations of international criminal law); Bellia
& Clark, supra note 89, at 1620-29 (First Congress intended to provide
only for remedies against U.S. nationals for a broad range of wrongs).
This form of interpretation goes somewhat against the current
predominance of the textualist approach to statutory interpretation. On
the framers and the First Congress, see David P. Currie, The Constitution
in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First Congress, 1789-1791, 61 U. CHI. L.
REV. 775, 777 (1994).
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Even if not extravagant, though, the comparison may be
unwise. For all its messiness and flaws, Congress’s
engagement with civil suits for terrorism damages
represents a legislature’s efforts to accommodate the law to
modern challenges. If it were so inclined, Congress could
craft a more contemporary statute expressly aimed at
providing a forum for vindication of human rights violations
committed against foreigners elsewhere. Such a law might
be valued in part for its role in increasing awareness not just
of human rights violations elsewhere but of the ways that
U.S. policy or actions may play a role, even if a very general
one, in them.
But Congress is not so inclined. Instead, as the ATS
atrophies, Congress moves with increasing boldness to
facilitate suits by Americans against foreign states and other
foreign entities and officials for terrorism. The politics of
fear—the construction of the world as filled with dangerous
others threatening the safety of ordinary Americans—
proceeds apace.346 To say that foreign human rights victims
346 See, e.g., Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the
United States, Executive Order, § 11 (March 6, 2017) (providing for
reporting on number of foreign nationals charged with terrorism-related
offenses or providing material support to terrorism in the United States
and on gender-based violence), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2017/03/06/executive-order-protecting-nation-foreign-
terrorist-entry-united-states; Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of
the United States, Executive Order No. 13768, § 13 (Jan. 25, 2017)
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are expelled from the courts even as American victims are
invited in is an oversimplification, to say the least. But the
different fates of ATS litigation and terrorism litigation over




safety-interior-united (establishing an office within U.S. Immigrations
and Customs Enforcement to “provide quarterly reports studying the
effects of the victimization by criminal aliens present in the United
States” and aid victims); David Nakamura, Trump Uses Speech Guest List




9e613afeb09f_story.html (“President Trump will feature family members
of Americans killed by illegal immigrants during his speech Tuesday to a
joint session of Congress, seeking to make an emotional appeal to build
support for stronger border-control measures.”).
